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This	 thesis	 examines	 the	 international	 political	 economy	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	from	a	theoretical	and	an	empirical	perspective.	The	literature	review	identifies	
the	limitations	in	the	existing	Economics	studies	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	and	the	research	
gap	 of	 the	 Comparative	 Political	 Economy	 (CPE)	 and	 International	 Political	 Economy	 (IPE)	
approaches	to	exchange	rate	politics.	The	author	develops	a	three-level	game	framework	for	
China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	based	on	revision	and	synthesis	of	the	existing	CPE	and	
IPE	 approaches.	 Specifically,	 the	 three-level	 game	 framework	 refers	 to	 the	 Chinese	
leadership’s	negotiations	with	the	international	bargainers	(mainly	the	U.S.	government	and	






three-level	 game	 framework	 is	 applied	 empirically	 through	 an	 examination	 of	 China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking	between	2003	and	2013.	The	empirical	studies	have	four	major	
findings.	 First,	 the	 level	 I	 game	 played	 an	 agenda-setting	 role	 in	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	before	the	2005	exchange	rate	reform.	Second,	the	level	II	game	determined	
the	limited	scope	of	the	initial	reform	and	the	subsequent	gradual	RMB	appreciation.	Third,	




the	 consensus	 to	 allow	 the	 RMB	 to	 appreciate	 against	 the	 dollar	 in	 a	 gradual	 and	 steady	
manner	to	improve	the	confidence	and	promote	the	international	use	of	RMB.	
	 This	 thesis	 provides	 original	 and	 systematic	 research	 on	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	 in	the	Hu-Wen	era	to	the	academic	 literature.	 It	makes	a	modest	theoretical	
contribution	to	the	existing	body	of	CPE	and	IPE	literature	by	developing	the	three-level	game	
framework	to	explain	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	More	importantly,	this	research	




















most	 important	 global	manufacturing	 centres	 since	 the	 1990s;	 is	 now	 the	world’s	 second	













































dramatically	after	China	acceded	 to	 the	World	Trade	Organization	 (WTO)	 in	2001.	China’s	













































China	 imbalance	 is	 that	 the	exchange	 rate	and	other	economic	policies	 followed	by	Asian	
countries,	 especially	 China,	 generated	 large	 amounts	 of	 current	 account	 surpluses.	 This	
helped	boost	consumption	and	credit	expansion	in	the	core	capitalist	countries,	especially	the	
US,	 with	 persistent	 trade	 deficits,	 by	 reducing	 the	 world	 interest	 rates	 and/or	 by	 simply	






has	maintained	 the	 RMB	 (or	 renminbi,	 often	 called	 the	 yuan,	 the	 official	 currency	 of	 the	
People’s	 Republic	 of	 China)	 at	 competitive	 (many	 analysts	 argue,	 undervalued)	 exchange	
rates	 against	 the	 US	 dollar.	 Furthermore,	 China’s	 central	 bank	 has	 engaged	 in	 massive	
sterilized	 intervention,	 by	 selling	 the	 RMB	 and	 buying	 the	 dollar,	 in	 the	 foreign	 exchange	






























































Moreover,	 the	 competing	 results	 of	 economics	 studies	 have	 contributed	 to	 vexed	
international	debates	and	bargaining	between	the	Western	and	Chinese	political	leaders.	The	






was	 best	 suited	 to	 China’s	 economic	 development.	 Furthermore,	 Kroeber	 points	 out	 that	
Western	officials	“view	an	exchange	rate	simply	as	a	price”	while	Chinese	leaders	“see	the	
exchange	 rate	 –	 and	 prices	 and	 market	 mechanisms	 in	 general	 –	 as	 tools	 in	 a	 broader	
development	strategy”.11	
This	thesis	is	mainly	focused	on	the	study	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	It	is	











actors	 are	 strongly	 involved	 in	 international	 trade	 or	 finance.” 12 	More	 importantly,	 as	
mentioned	 before,	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 value	 and	 regime,	 because	 of	 the	 country’s	
enormous	trade	and	capital	flows,	has	had	considerable	impacts	on	the	global	economy	and	



























































































regime?	What	are	 the	key	causes	of	 the	 three	 turning	points	of	exchange	 rate	
policy	change?	How	to	explain	 the	gradual,	 rather	 than	one-off,	pattern	of	 the	
RMB	appreciation?	Additionally,	why	have	some	policy	preferences	prevailed	in	
policymaking	at	the	expense	of	others	during	different	periods	of	time?	





international	 pressures,	 domestic	ministerial	 interests	 and	domestic	 interest	 groups	when	
making	RMB	exchange	rate	policies.	More	specifically,	the	international	influences	played	an	
agenda-setting	role	in	both	the	2005	and	the	2010	RMB	exchange	rate	reforms.	However,	the	












As	mentioned	 before,	 there	 have	 been	 large	 amounts	 of	 Economics	 studies	 on	 the	 RMB	
exchange	 rate.	 However,	 it	 is	 difficult	 for	 economists	 to	 arrive	 at	 any	 firm	 and	 robust	
conclusion	about	the	equilibrium	RMB	exchange	rate	and	precise	level	of	RMB	exchange	rate	
misalignment.	 Chapter	2	 Section	2.1	will	 specifically	 show	 that	 existing	 Economics	 studies	
have	 yielded	 a	 very	 wide	 range	 of	 estimates.	 Moreover,	 the	 major	 shortcoming	 of	 the	
Economics	 studies	on	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate	 is	 that	economists	generally	assume	a	pure	
economic	world	in	which	only	the	price	and	market	mechanism	take	effect,	but	neglect	the	
political	 factors	 such	 as	 the	 state,	 institutions	 and	 political	 leaders.	 The	 inconclusive	
Economics	studies	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	are	unsatisfactory.	Therefore,	there	have	been	
numerous	attempts	by	scholars	of	political	economy	to	interpret	the	nature,	or	explain	the	
mechanism,	 of	 exchange	 rate	 politics	 and,	 more	 specifically,	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	behaviour.	
	 On	 the	one	hand,	 the	Comparative	Political	Economy	 (CPE)	 literature	has	provided	
more	 nuanced	 explanations	 by	 examining	 the	 domestic	 interests	 and	 institutions	 that	
influences	exchange	rate	policymaking.	However,	as	will	be	analysed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	
2	Parts	2.2.1	and	2.2.2,	most	of	the	existing	CPE	studies	are	western-centric	and	have	their	
limitations	 when	 applied	 to	 explain	 China’s	 case.	 The	 assumptions	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate	
politics	models	in	liberal	market	economies	with	democratic	politics	do	not	hold	in	China,	as	
China’s	 institutions,	 characterized	 by	 one-party	 rule	 and	 party-state	 system,	 are	
fundamentally	different	from	Western	liberal	democracies.	
	 Moreover,	limited	work	is	dedicated	to	figuring	out	the	political	structure	of	China’s	




The	 black	 box	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking,	 filled	 with	 the	 interplay	 of	 China’s	
domestic	 political	 powers	 and	 societal	 interests,	 remains	 unopened.	 Therefore,	 there	 is	 a	
need	 for	 a	more	 “indigenous”	 investigation	 into	China’s	 political	 structure	 and	process	 of	
exchange	rate	policymaking.	Lastly,	 the	CPE	 literature	focuses	on	the	domestic	 factors	but	








state-society	 when	 making	 exchange	 rate	 policy.	 One	 cannot	 fully	 understand	 China’s	
exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 without	 reference	 to	 interactions	 between	 international	 and	
domestic	levels.	
	 Therefore,	 the	 literature	 review,	 the	 second	chapter	of	 the	 thesis,	will	 identify	 the	
limitations	in	the	existing	Economics	studies	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	and	the	research	gap	
of	the	CPE	and	IPE	approaches	to	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	“The	persistence	of	the	
Communist	 Party	 in	 China	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 striking	 feathers	 of	 the	 Chinese	 economic	
reform.”14	Before	proceeding	to	develop	a	theoretical	framework	for	China’s	exchange	rate	










the	 16th	 CCP	 Central	 Committee	 in	 November	 2002.	 The	 number	 of	 Politburo	 Standing	
Committee	(PSC)	membership	increased	from	seven	in	the	era	of	Jiang	to	nine	in	the	era	of	








Deng	Xiaoping’s	 southern	 tour	 in	1992.	 Jiang	was	 consistently	dedicated	 to	 reforming	 the	
central	planning	 system	and	 creating	a	 competitive	market	within	China.	At	 the	14th	CCP	
National	Congress	in	October	1992,	Jiang	delivered	a	report	entitled	“Accelerating	the	pace	
of	 reform	and	opening	up	and	 the	modernization	construction	 to	win	 the	great	victory	of	
29	
	
socialism	with	 Chinese	 characteristics”.15	It	was	 the	 first	 time	 that	 the	Chinese	 leadership	
declared	 that	 the	 target	 of	 China’s	 economic	 reform	 was	 to	 establish	 a	 socialist	 market	
economy.	At	the	third	Plenary	Session	of	the	14th	CCP	Central	Committee	in	November	1993	
the	Party	passed	the	“Decision	of	the	CCP	Central	Committee	on	some	issues	concerning	the	
improvement	 of	 the	 socialist	 market	 economy”,	 which	 allowed	 the	 market	 to	 play	 a	
fundamental	role	in	resource	allocation	under	the	macroeconomic	management.16	The	mid-
1990s	witnessed	a	series	of	economic	reforms,	 including	reforms	of	enterprise	system,	tax	
sharing	system,	 financial	 system,	 foreign	 trade	system	and	 foreign	exchange	management	
system.	In	particular,	Jiang	Zemin	and	Zhu	Rongji	pushed	forward	a	large-scale	privatization	
to	reorganize	the	state-owned	enterprises	in	1997	and	1998.	China	experienced	a	dramatic	
transition	 from	 central	 planning	 to	market	 economy	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 China’s	 economy	
changed	accordingly	in	the	1990s.	As	Coase	and	Wang	noted,	




[2012],	 private	 entrepreneurship	 is	 the	 primary	 driving	 force	 of	 the	 Chinese	





















	 The	 infrastructure	 conditions	 the	 superstructure.	 Jiang’s	 most	 important	





the	 fundamental	 interests	 of	 the	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 the	 Chinese	 people”.20	
Jiang’s	“Three	Represents”	Theory	was	widely	interpreted,	both	at	home	and	abroad,	
as	 an	 official	 justification	 to	 expand	 party	membership	 to	 include	 elites	 of	 all	 social	















also	 productive	 elements	 in	 society”	 and	 also	 “a	 partial	 admission	 that	 the	 social	
makeup	 of	 China	 was	 becoming	more	 complex”.21	Miller	 also	 remarked	 that	 “Jiang	
Zemin’s	 ‘three	 represents’	 thus	 reflected	 the	Party	 leadership’s	decision	 to	pursue	a	
strategy	of	political	co-option	with	regard	to	the	entrepreneurial,	managerial,	technical,	
and	professional	elites	who	were	emerging	in	Chinese	society	as	a	consequence	of	the	




key	 institutions	 to	promote	 the	Western	norms	of	 neoliberal	 global	 trade.	Although	
there	is	a	heated	debate	over	the	relationship	between	the	world	liberal	order	and	the	
rise	of	China	in	the	twenty-first	century23,	two	implications	of	China’s	entry	into	WTO	
after	 the	 15-year-long	 negotiations	 should	 be	 clear.	 First,	 the	 Chinese	 leadership	


















engagement	 with	 the	 world	 economy	 in	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 meant	 that	
international	interests	were	much	more	entangled	in	China’s	domestic	politics.	Special	









Therefore,	 Hu	 did	 not	 enjoy	 as	 much	 political	 capital	 as	 his	 predecessors	 and	 “seemed	
purposefully	 and	 consistently	 advertised	 simply	 as	 primus	 inter	 pares”. 27 	Brown,	 in	 his	




















when	 making	 economic	 policies.	 There	 was	 correspondingly	 greater	 pluralization	 and	
institutionalization	 of	 economic	 policymaking	 under	 Hu	 and	 Wen. 29 	“The	 complexity	 of	
market	 and	 political	 administration	 leads	 to	 a	more	 sophisticated	 approach	 to	 economic	
policy	 formulation	 and	 implementation,	 requiring	 more	 professionalism	 in	 economic	
policymaking.”30	Inputs	 into	 policy	 deliberations	mainly	 come	 from	 government	 agencies.	
Therefore,	bureaucratic	politics	plays	an	important	role	in	China’s	economic	policy	making.	
The	 policy	 outcomes	 cannot	 be	 well	 understood	 without	 “looking	 at	 the	 interactions	 of	
officials	in	different,	and	often	competing,	government	agencies	who	are	mostly	motivated	
by	their	organization’s	interests”.31	
	 With	 an	 increasingly	 complex	 array	 of	 interests,	 Hu	 and	Wen	 could	 only	 exercise	
effective	governance	by	maintaining	a	politics	of	consensus	at	the	top.	Chinese	politics	in	the	




















“Hu	 spoke,	 as	 always,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 collective	 leadership,	 a	man	who	 delivered	
consensus.	He	never	placed	himself	in	the	position	of	supreme	leader,	avoiding	




“Mr	 Hu	 was	 the	 great	 consensus	 builder,	 almost	 pathologically	 tedious	 in	 his	














































line	of	Gini	coefficient	 in	the	2000s.40	After	the	 leadership	transition	 in	2002,	Hu	and	Wen	
explicitly	showed	their	shifted	priority	to	sustainable	development	and	social	development.	
Liew	and	Wu	recognize	that	“there	is	without	doubt	a	fundamental	shift	in	emphasis	between	
the	 Jiang	 Zemin-Zhu	 Rongji	 and	 the	 Hu	 Jintao-Wen	 Jiabao	 leadership.	 While	 the	 former	
leadership	 was	 deeply	 concerned	 with	 engaging	 the	 global	 economy,	 the	 latter	 is	 more	
concerned	with	poverty	 and	 income	 inequality,	 especially	 in	 the	 countryside	 and	western	
China.”41	For	instance,	the	first	two	public	visits	by	Hu	Jintao	as	general	secretary	were	not	to	
the	modern	and	prosperous	cities	of	Shanghai	or	Shenzhen	but	rather	to	Xibaipo	[西柏坡],	a	
village	 in	 Hebei,	 and	 Inner	 Mongolia.	 Particularly,	 Hu	 Jintao	 put	 forward	 the	 “scientific	
development	outlook”	 [科学发展观]	 in	 the	Third	Plenary	Session	of	 the	16th	CCP	Central	






















































































The	 explanatory	 power	 of	 the	 adapted	 three-level	 game	 framework	 cannot	 be	 taken	 for	













China’s	exchange	 rate	policy	was	not	a	key	 issue	 in	 the	 international	 society	before	2003,	
though	China	had	pegged	the	RMB	to	the	US	dollar	after	1995.	However,	the	year	of	2003	
witnessed	the	sudden	emergence	of	bills	and	resolutions	 (ten	 in	 total)	 in	 the	US	Congress	
targeting	China’s	currency	manipulation	and	undervaluation.	On	the	one	hand,	China’s	trade	





the	Treasury’s	Reports	 to	Congress	on	 International	 Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	Policies	
demonstrated	that	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	became	Treasury’s	main	concern	after	late	
2003.	 The	 Reports	 reiterated	 that	 China’s	 fixed	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 was	 no	 longer	



















view	 that	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	 find	 persuasive	 evidence	 that	 the	 RMB	 was	 substantially	
undervalued,	though	they	also	proposed	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility	for	China.48	
	 In	 terms	 of	 China’s	 domestic	 politics,	 the	 PBOC	 was	 the	 key	 ministry	 leading	 the	
change	 for	RMB	exchange	 rate	 reform.	 Zhou	Xiaochuan	 [周小川],	 the	Governor	of	 PBOC,	
made	consistent	efforts	to	advocate	that	exchange	rate	flexibility	would	provide	the	Chinese	
authorities	 with	 additional	 tools	 to	 control	 excessive	 monetary	 supply	 and	 inflationary	




could	 further	undermine	 social	 stability.	Particularly,	 after	Bo	Xilai	 [薄熙来]	 succeeded	Lü	
Fuyuan	[吕福源]	as	the	Minister	of	Commerce	in	late	February	2004,	the	MOFCOM	under	Bo	














Bush	administration	became	 increasingly	 critical	of	China’s	delayed	move,	which	 could	be	
seen	from	the	blunter	words	of	Treasury	Secretary’s	statements	and	Treasury’s	Reports.	The	
IMF	also	adopted	an	increasingly	tough	stance	toward	China’s	currency.	In	a	nutshell,	the	re-
emergence	 of	 external	 pressure	 on	 RMB	 undervaluation	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2005	 brought	





















PBOC	 announced	 that	 China	would	 implement	 a	managed	 floating	 exchange	 rate	 regime	
based	on	market	demand	and	supply	with	reference	to	a	basket	of	currencies.	Furthermore,	




	 This	 policy	 outcome	was	 interpreted	 as	 a	 compromise	 between	 international	 and	
domestic	bargainers.	The	international	pressure	did	play	an	agenda-setting	role,	which	means	
that	 it	 made	 China’s	 leaders	 unable	 to	 avoid	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 issue.	 The	 growing	
external	 pressure	 on	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 issue	 forced	 the	 Chinese	 leadership	 to	 put	
exchange	rate	reform	on	a	task	list	in	2005.	The	two	key	ministries	with	influence	in	the	State	
Council	and	 the	CLGFE	were	divided	 internally	 concerning	 the	possibility	of	exchange	 rate	
policy	change.	However,	the	MOFCOM	was	more	influential	over	the	central	government’s	














China’s	 currency	 waned	 gradually.	 There	 were	 two	 bills	 after	 PBOC’s	 announcement	 of	
exchange	rate	reform	in	July	2005	and	only	one	bill	in	2006	targeting	the	RMB	issue.	However,	
the	 Treasury	 kept	 a	 close	 eye	 on	 the	 subsequent	 development	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
reform.	 The	 Treasury’s	 Reports	 recognized	 that	 China’s	 new	 exchange	 rate	 mechanism	










	 The	 Chinese	 leadership	 took	 a	 very	 cautious	 approach	 toward	 the	 exchange	 rate	
reform.	Both	 the	PBOC	and	 the	MOFCOM	closely	monitored	 the	 impact	of	 exchange	 rate	
reform	on	export	enterprises	in	the	second	half	of	2005.	As	the	initial	revaluation	was	limited	
and	the	subsequent	appreciation	was	gradual,	China’s	exports	maintained	the	momentum	







opponent	 of	 fast	 RMB	 appreciation.	 The	 MOFCOM	 was	 particularly	 concerned	 with	 the	
several	export	 industries	such	as	textile	and	apparel	 industries	that	were	sensitive	to	RMB	
appreciation.	Bo	particularly	stressed	that	“RMB	appreciation	has	substantially	lowered	the	






	 As	mentioned,	 the	 PBOC	was	 politically	 weaker	 and	 less	 influential	 in	 China’s	 top	
leadership	compared	with	the	MOFCOM.	The	limited	nature	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	
produced	little	change	in	the	economic	fundamentals	that	had	induced	the	PBOC	to	favour	
additional	 flexibility	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 The	 preservation	 of	 a	 gradually	 and	 continuously	
appreciated	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 ultimately	 eroded	 PBOC’s	monetary	 policy	 autonomy,	 in	
circumstances	 whereby	 China	 ran	 persistent	 current	 account	 surpluses.	 The	 PBOC	 faced	












policy	became	 tougher,	which	 could	be	 seen	 from	 the	blunter	 language	of	 the	 Treasury’s	
Reports.	With	regard	to	the	IMF,	one	could	identify	the	same	trend	of	more	severe	pressure.	






used	 to	 be	 a	 vocal	 opponent	 of	 RMB	 appreciation.	 However,	 the	MOFCOM	 softened	 its	
resistance	to	RMB	appreciation	 in	2007,	as	 its	main	task	changed	from	maintaining	export	
growth	 to	 reducing	excessive	 trade	surplus.	Chinese	exporters	 faced	unprecedented	 trade	
frictions	 in	 2006,	 which	 put	 enormous	 pressure	 on	 the	 MOFCOM	 to	 settle	 those	 trade	
disputes	 and	 preserve	 the	 interests	 of	 export	 industries.	 MOFCOM’s	 shifted	 priority	 on	
balance	of	international	payments	provided	political	space	for	PBOC’s	advocate	of	exchange	
rate	reform.	The	PBOC	faced	increasing	and	enormous	inflationary	pressure	in	2007,	and	all	













will	 be	 expanded	 from	 0.3%	 to	 0.5%,	 namely,	 the	 daily	 RMB-dollar	 trading	 band	may	 be	



























grew	 fast	 and	 there	was	no	 sharp	decline	 in	exports	as	opponents	of	RMB	exchange	 rate	
reform	had	feared.	However,	exporters	became	strongly	opposed	to	the	RMB	appreciation	in	
early	2008,	as	the	pace	of	appreciation	had	accelerated.	Chinese	exporters	grew	hostile	to	






guanxi-based	 lobbying	 through	 local	 governments,	 guanxi-based	 lobbying	 through	 local	
offices	of	central	governmental	agencies,	and	lobbying	through	trade	associations.	
	 Before	we	proceed	 to	 the	empirical	 findings,	 it	 is	necessary	 for	us	 to	make	a	clear	
definition	of	“guanxi”	herein,	which	has	diverse	meanings	in	the	context	of	China’s	society.	A	
considerable	 amount	 of	 literature	 has	 been	 published	 to	 identify	 the	 broad	meanings	 of	
guanxi	 and	 to	 emphasize	 the	 important	 roles	 of	 guanxi	 in	 China’s	 political,	 economic	 and	
social	fields.	For	instance,	Yang	understands	guanxi	in	her	comprehensive	study	on	everyday	
social	relationships	in	contemporary	China	in	the	following	way:	
“The	 word	 guanxi	 (pronounced	 guan-shee)	 means	 literally	 ‘a	 relationship’	
between	 objects,	 forces,	 or	 persons.	When	 it	 is	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 relationships	
between	 people,	 not	 only	 can	 it	 be	 applied	 to	 husband-wife,	 kinship	 and	









“The	 instrumental	 dimension	 primarily	 involves	 self-interested	motivation:	 the	
desire	 for	 repayment	 of	 favours	 and	 for	 achieving	 personal	 advantage.	 The	
etiquette	dimension	 involves	the	use	of	social	 rituals	 to	establish	and	maintain	
harmonious	 human	 relations	with	 one's	 acquaintances,	 coworkers,	 colleagues,	
superiors	or	subordinates.	The	moral	dimension	is	established	and	maintained	by	


















there	 is	 a	 growing	 body	 of	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 guanxi’s	 important	 role	 in	 China’s	 socio-
economic	environment.	To	name	a	few,	Xin	and	Pearce	view	guanxi	as	“substitutes	for	formal	
institutional	support”,	in	the	context	of	China’s	underdeveloped	legal	framework.60	Deng	and	









guanxi	 and	more	 narrowly	 defines	 guanxi	 as	 interpersonal	 connections	 and	 relationships,	
which	 aims	 to	 secure	 favours	 in	 personal	 or	 business	 relations.	 It	 is	 proper	 to	 borrow	
Kennedy’s	description	of	guanxi	to	elaborate	my	definition	here:	
“Officials	provide	entrepreneurs	access	to	scarce	goods,	credit,	government	and	
overseas	markets,	 and	 protection	 from	 onerous	 regulations.	 Entrepreneurs,	 in	














setting,	 and	 can	 play	 a	 role	 in	 exerting	 influence	 that	 is	 not	 possible	 through	 formal	








their	 difficulties	 with	 the	 local	 officials	 of	 central	 government	 agencies,	 particular	 the	




to	export	 rebates	 in	 the	early	2008.	They	asserted	 that	 if	 the	 central	 government	did	not	
intervene,	 large	amounts	of	 labour-intensive	enterprises	would	go	bankrupt,	 thousands	of	
workers	would	be	laid	off,	and	social	stability	would	therefore	be	threatened.	
	 The	central	argument	is	that	the	exporters’	lobbying	imposed	enormous	pressure	on	






centres	 in	 the	 coastal	 provinces.	 The	 top	 leadership	 conducted	 intensive	 research	 and	























importantly,	 there	was	much	 less	 internal	 controversy	within	Chinese	 central	 government	
with	regard	to	the	exchange	rate	policy	in	2010.	Both	the	PBOC	and	the	MOFCOM	held	the	












	 However,	 it	 remained	 questionable	 why	 the	 domestic	 politics	 of	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	in	2010	was	different	from	that	in	2005.	The	thesis	further	explores	the	origins	



















external	 influences	 from	 the	 Western	 countries	 and	 the	 internal	 needs	 of	 RMB	
internationalization.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 international	 criticism	 and	 pressure	 from	 the	 US	













This	 thesis	mainly	employs	 four	qualitative	 research	methods:	documentary	analysis,	 case	









research	 based	 on	 documentary	 analysis.	 The	 basis	 of	 primary	 sources	 derives	 from:	 (1)	
publicly	available	official	documents	(i.e.	official	reports,	publications,	statements,	speeches	
from	 related	 organizations/ministries/agencies)	 and	 (2)	 relevant	 information	 in	 various	
published	forms	(i.e.	official	declarations	and	press	statements	as	well	as	media	reports	and	
commentaries	via	newspapers	and	magazines).	




meaning	 when	 situated	 within	 a	 context	 set	 by	 vigorous	 analytical	 and	








level	 II	 games	of	China’s	exchange	 rate	policymaking.	First,	 the	 level	 I	 game	examines	 the	










dollar.	 All	 the	 Reports	 are	 available	 through	 the	 Treasury	 Resource	 Center. 66 	The	 US	

















IMF	 also	 publishes	 a	 large	 number	 of	 working	 papers,	 press	 briefing	 transcripts,	 and	
conference	transcripts,	which	are	also	available	through	the	website	of	PRC	and	the	IMF.70	
	 Second,	 the	 level	 II	 game	 involves	 the	 two	 most	 important	 ministries	 (PBOC	 and	
MOFCOM)	within	China’s	central	government.	The	stance	of	PBOC	and	MOFCOM	towards	the	
RMB	exchange	rate	policy	can	be	examined	by	the	statements	and	speeches	of	PBOC’s	and	
MOFCOM’s	 senior	 officials,	 including	 PBOC’s	 Governor	 &	 Deputy	 Governors	 and	 the	
MOFCOM’s	Minister	 &	 Vice	Ministers.	 The	 official	 websites	 of	 PBOC	 and	MOFCOM	 offer	
search	engines	that	help	researchers	to	get	access	to	those	data.71	Furthermore,	the	PBOC	
has	published	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Reports	[货币政策执行报告]	every	quarter	





















deliberations	 and	 decisions	 of	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 In	 addition	 to	 consulting	 the	
scholarly	works	written	in	English,	the	author	made	use	of	materials	in	Chinese.	The	Chinese	



























size	 and	 diversity	 of	 China,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 find	 a	 single	 provincial	 case	 study	 that	 is	
representative	of	the	country	as	a	whole;	no	such	“typical”	province	exists.	Fujian	is	chosen	
as	the	case	study	focus	for	this	thesis	as	it	is	representative	not	of	China	as	a	whole,	but	of	
those	 coastal	 provinces	 that	 have	 been	most	 significant	 in	 driving	 the	 growth	 of	 Chinese	




	 The	researcher	distributed	98	questionnaires	 to	export	entrepreneurs	 in	 the	Fujian	
province	 and	 63	 valid	 responses	 were	 collected	 for	 analysis.	 The	 questionnaires	 mainly	
collected	the	following	information:	(1)	whether	the	business	was	affected	by	RMB	exchange	
rate	fluctuations,	(2)	in	which	years	the	enterprise	was	significantly	affected	by	RMB	exchange	
rate	 fluctuations,	 (3)	 what	 measures	 were	 taken	 in	 times	 of	 volatile	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	
fluctuations,	 and	most	 importantly,	 (4)	 how	difficult	 and	 effective	 did	 exporters	 find	 it	 to	




	 The	 researcher	 also	 arranged	 22	 semi-structured	 interviews	 with	 export	
entrepreneurs,	association	representatives	and	local	government	officials	at	different	levels.	






associations	 and	 local	 government	 officials	 when	 the	 business	 of	 export	 enterprises	 was	








to	 the	 local	 industry	associations	and	government	officials	 in	difficult	 times	of	accelerated	
RMB	appreciation.	Furthermore,	the	interviews	examined	whether	local	politicians	advocated	
on	behalf	of	their	constituents’	preferences.	Last,	if	the	final	decision	taken	by	the	top	leader	
reflected	 the	 considerations	 of	 the	 government	 officials,	 industry	 associations	 and	 export	
enterprises	at	the	local	level,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	empirical	research	provided	support	
for	the	level	III	game	in	2008.	


















The	 researcher	 used	 interviews	 as	 a	 complementary	 research	 method	 to	 documentary	







and	 the	MOFCOM	Minister).	 Instead,	 it	 was	 more	 realistic	 to	 get	 access	 to	 the	 (former)	
members	of	the	Monetary	Policy	Department	(MPD)	[货币政策司],	especially	those	who	are	
distinguished	 professors	 at	 China’s	 universities	 and	 research	 councils	 (such	 as	 Peking	
University,	Renmin	University	of	China,	and	Chinese	Academy	of	Social	Sciences).	The	MPD	is	










“Elite	 interviewers	must	 be	 prepared	 to	 explore	 the	 world	 of	 the	 respondent	
sympathetically	without	being	captured	by	it.	They	must	have	a	research	design	
that	 is	 flexible	 and	 open	 to	 new	 ideas	 and	 interpretations,	 while	 still	 being	
informed	 by	 an	 overarching	 theoretical	 framework	 and	 a	 central	 research	
question.”79	
	 During	 the	author’s	 field	 research	 in	Beijing,	 a	 total	 of	 13	 face-to-face	elite/expert	
interviews	were	conducted.	Most	of	the	elite	interviews	lasted	around	one	hour	and	some	




















rate	policymaking	 in	the	Hu-Wen	era	to	the	academic	 literature.	Though	there	 is	a	heated	
debate	over	the	RMB	exchange	rate	policy	in	the	twenty-first	century,	little	systematic	work	
has	 been	 done	 to	 explain	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 The	 most	 important	




into	 the	 decision-making	 process	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy.	 Moreover,	 the	
methodological	 triangulation	of	questionnaires	and	 interviews	 in	 the	 case	 study	gives	 this	
research	a	firm	grounding	in	advancing	our	understanding	on	the	inner	mechanisms	of	the	
interest	group	politics	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	Therefore,	the	empirical	study	
provides	 a	 richer	 portrait	 of	 the	 dynamism	 and	 complexity	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	in	the	Hu-Wen	era.	
	 Second,	the	thesis	makes	a	modest	theoretical	contribution	to	the	existing	body	of	
CPE	 and	 IPE	 literature	 by	 developing	 the	 three-level	 game	 framework	 to	 explain	 China’s	







	 Third,	and	 related	 to	 the	previous	 two	contributions,	 the	 thesis	also	builds	bridges	
between	researchers	and	policymakers.	Stone	notes	that	“there	is	a	lack	of	dialogue	between	
researchers	and	policy-makers	and	that	 inadequate	or	 insufficient	use	 is	made	of	research	
findings.” 81 	The	 author	 overcomes	 the	 problem	 by	 linking	 the	 research	 to	 a	 theoretical	
framework	 that	 guides	 the	entire	empirical	 investigation.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	 insight	of	
perceptions,	 experiences,	 attitudes	 and	 actions	 gained	 from	 the	 elite/expert	 interviews	 is	
conducive	 to	 verifying	 the	 theoretical	 framework.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 theoretical	
framework	would	 help	 the	 practical	 policy-makers,	 in	 both	Western	 countries	 and	 China,	
understand	 the	mechanism	of	China’s	exchange	 rate	policymaking.	Overall,	 the	 thesis	 is	a	
timely	and	rigorous	study	of	the	role	that	international	and	domestic	politics	play	in	forging	
China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking,	 which	 promotes	 mutual	 understanding	 of	 both	
researchers	and	policymakers.	
1.9	Outline	of	the	thesis	
This	 thesis	 consists	 of	 seven	 chapters,	 including	 this	 introduction	 and	 a	 conclusion.	 The	










literature	 that	 this	 research	 is	 going	 to	 fill.	 Based	 on	 the	 development	 of	 a	 synthesized	





theoretical	 approaches	 have	 limitations	 when	 applied	 to	 China’s	 case.	 It	 also	 develops	 a	
theoretical	framework	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking,	based	on	revision	and	synthesis	





strives	 to	 reconcile	 international	 pressures,	 domestic	 ministerial	 interests	 and	 domestic	
interest	groups	when	making	exchange	rate	policy.	
	 Chapters	 3,	 4,	 5	 and	 6	 are	 in-depth	 empirical	 studies	 that	 serve	 to	 validate	 the	
applicability	 of	 the	 three-level	 game	 framework.	 The	 empirical	 studies	 have	 four	 major	
findings.	 First,	 the	 level	 I	 game	 played	 an	 agenda-setting	 role	 in	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	before	the	2005	exchange	rate	reform.	Second,	the	level	II	game	determined	
the	limited	scope	of	the	initial	reform	and	the	subsequent	gradual	RMB	appreciation.	Third,	






the	 consensus	 to	 allow	 the	 RMB	 to	 appreciate	 against	 the	 dollar	 in	 a	 gradual	 and	 steady	
manner	to	improve	the	confidence	and	promote	the	international	use	of	RMB.	
	 The	 concluding	 chapter	 summarises	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 and	 the	 empirical	
findings	of	the	thesis,	and	then	relates	China’s	exchange	rate	reforms	to	the	wider	context	of	
China’s	politics.	The	empirical	studies	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	from	2003	to	2013	have	










and	 IPE	 studies	 on	 exchange	 rate	 politics.	 The	 three	 techniques	 to	 measure	 the	 RMB	
equilibrium	exchange	rate	in	the	Economics	studies	have	produced	inconclusive	results.	The	






It	 critically	 examines	 the	 four	 theoretical	 approaches	 to	 politics	 of	 exchange	 rate	 and	
identifies	the	respective	limitations	of	the	existing	studies	on	China’s	exchange	rate	politics.	
	 This	 chapter	 further	 develops	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	based	on	revision	and	synthesis	of	the	existing	CPE	and	IPE	approaches	to	fill	




light	 on	 the	 interactive	 dynamics	 of	 international	 politics	 and	 domestic	 politics	 in	 the	
formulation	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policy.	Finally	the	chapter	extends	Putnam’s	two-level	
game	to	a	three-level	game	and	develops	a	theoretical	framework	of	China’s	exchange	rate	




between	 central	 government’s	 ministries	 at	 the	 central	 governmental	 level	 (level	 II)	 and	
negotiations	with	the	domestic	interest	groups	and	local	governments	at	the	local	level	(level	
III).	 It	 argues	 that	 the	 Chinese	 top	 leadership	 strives	 to	 reconcile	 international	 pressures,	





















approach	on	exchange	 rate	 are	based	on	 the	Balassa-Samuelson	hypothesis.	 The	Balassa-
Samuelson	effect	describes	the	phenomenon	that	the	tradable	sectors’	productivity	increase	
will	raise	the	wage	rates	in	both	the	tradable	and	non-tradable	sectors,	which	further	increase	
the	 price	 of	 non-tradable	 goods	 and	 services	 and	 result	 in	 the	 appreciation	 of	 the	 real	
exchange	rate.83	
	 Since	 China’s	 economy	 has	 grown	 rapidly	 in	 the	 recent	 decades,	 it	 is	 especially	
relevant	to	determine	whether	the	Balassa-Samuelson	effect	is	valid	for	China’s	case	and	to	
further	 estimate	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 misalignment.	 However,	 there	 exist	 competing	
results	with	regard	to	the	validity	of	 the	Balassa-Samuelson	hypothesis	 in	China’s	case.	To	
name	but	a	few,	Coudert	and	Couharde	evidence	a	lack	of	Balassa	effect	in	China.	They	find	a	
large	 gap	 between	 the	 prediction	made	 with	 a	 Balassa-Samuelson	model	 and	 the	 actual	
behaviour	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate,	so	they	turn	to	use	other	method	(see	FEER	approach	


































In	 contrast	 to	 the	 PPP	 approach,	 the	 second	 technique	 is	 the	 Fundamental	 Equilibrium	


























current	 account	 surplus. 93 	Anderson	 follows	 Goldstein’s	 approach	 to	 find	 that	 RMB	
undervaluation	was	about	15	to	20	percent	and	the	adjustment	would	require	a	revaluation	
of	 18	 to	 25	 percent.94	Coudert	 and	 Couharde	 use	 the	 FEER	method	 to	 calculate	 the	 real	
effective	exchange	rate	consistent	with	sustainable	current	accounts	and	find	that	the	RMB	






















	 It	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 estimations	 using	 the	 FEER	 approach	 have	 produced	 more	
































RMB	 has	 been	 constantly	 undervalued	 against	 the	 US	 dollar.	 The	 peak	 undervaluation	






equilibrium	 rate	 within	 a	 narrow	 band,	 which	 implies	 that	 the	 currency	 was	 consistently	
undervalued.102	Chen,	Deng	and	Kemme	select	the	sample	period	from	1997	to	2007Q3	and	















































Author	 Year	 Approach	 Results	









Ju	et	al	 2011	 PPP	 A	lack	of	the	Balassa-Samuelson	effect	
Goldstein	 2004	 FEER	 Significantly	undervalued	on	an	order	of	15%	to	25%	
Anderson	 2005	 FEER	 RMB	undervaluation	was	about	15%	to	20%	and	the	
adjustment	would	require	a	revaluation	of	18%	to	25%	
Goldstein	et	al	 2006	 FEER	 Significantly	undervalued	on	an	order	of	20%	to	40%	
Goldstein	et	al	 2007	 FEER	 A	35%	to	60%	real	appreciation	of	the	renminbi	is	
required	to	eliminate	China’s	current	account	surplus	
Coudert	et	al	 2005,	2007	 FEER	 Highly	undervalued	(10%-33%)	between	2002	and	2005	
in	effective	terms	and	even	more	(35%)	against	the	US	
dollar	






Chen	 2007	 BEER	 The	RMB	were	undervalued	during	most	part	of	sample	
period	from	1994	Q1	to	2006	Q2,	but	the	misalignment	
had	a	trend	to	become	smaller	and	smaller	
Wang	et	al	 2007	 BEER	 The	RMB	fluctuated	around	its	equilibrium	rate	within	a	
narrow	band	and	were	consistently	undervalued	
Chen	et	al	 2008	 BEER	 The	RMB	fluctuated	with	undervaluation	up	to	4%	and	
overvaluation	up	to	6%	from	1997	to	2007Q3	














subjective	 judgments	of	 the	various	 researchers	 in	deriving	 their	 results,	 and	 instability	 in	
underlying	economic	relationships,	especially	in	a	rapidly	developing	economy	like	China”.105	
	 However,	if	we	think	outside	the	box,	the	major	shortcoming	of	the	Economics	studies	
on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	 is	 that	economists	generally	assume	a	pure	economic	world	 in	
which	only	the	price	and	market	mechanism	take	effect,	but	neglect	political	factors	such	as	
state,	 institutions	 and	 political	 leaders.	 As	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 is	 known	 to	 be	
formulated	and	implemented	by	leaders	in	the	Chinese	central	government,	more	in	depth	
examination	 on	 China’s	 domestic	 politics	 would	 be	 conducive	 to	 understanding	 the	 RMB	
exchange	rate	policymaking.	Moreover,	the	competing	results	of	existing	Economics	studies	
have	 further	 stoked	 debates	 and	 bargaining	 in	 international	 politics	 as	 well	 as	 China’s	
















mainstream	 economists	 is	 that	 China’s	 external	 imbalance	 has	 explicated	 that	 the	 RMB	
exchange	rate	is	far	away	from	the	equilibrium	and	that	policy	changes	should	be	made	to	
address	the	RMB	misalignment.107	However,	the	Chinese	side	does	not	simply	attribute	the	
external	 imbalance	 to	 exchange	 rate	 misalignment.	 The	 Chinese	 leadership	 regards	 the	
exchange	rate	as	one	component	in	the	toolkit	of	development	strategy,	in	which	the	priority	
is	not	 to	create	a	market	economy	or	 to	achieve	market	equilibrium	but	 to	make	China	a	


















“The	 parallel	 existence	 and	 mutual	 interaction	 of	 ‘state’	 and	 ‘market’	 in	 the	
modern	world	create	‘political	economy.’	…	In	the	absence	of	the	state,	the	price	


























Three	 models	 of	 exchange	 rate	 politics	 have	 been	 developed	 within	 this	 approach:	 the	
electoral	model,	the	partisan	model	and	the	sectoral	model.	




office-seeking	or	 for	partisan	preferences.	More	 specifically,	 Tufte	elaborates	 that	elected	
politicians	 may	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 adopt	 flexible	 exchange	 rate	 regimes	 before	 universal	
suffrages,	 which	 help	 them	 to	 carry	 out	 expansionary	 macroeconomic	 policies	 to	 boost	
economic	growth	and	reduce	unemployment	at	the	time	of	elections.112	By	contrast,	Oatley	
finds	that	leftist	parties	are	less	inclined	to	maintain	a	fixed	exchange	rate,	because	they	are	

















the	 relative	 power	 among	 the	 various	 socio-economic	 interest	 groups	 as	 a	 key	 factor	
influencing	exchange	rate	policy.	On	this	basis,	the	sectoral	model	is	also	termed	the	interest	
group	 model.	 The	 sector	 model	 suggests	 that	 different	 domestic	 sectors	 have	 different	
preferred	degrees	of	exchange	rate	flexibility	and	levels	of	exchange	rate.	More	specifically,	
domestically	 based	 groups	 favour	 floating	 exchange	 rates,	 while	 internationally	 oriented	




simple	 but	 provide	 useful	 insights	 because	 they	 have	 respectively	 identified	 plausible	
explanatory	variables	and	elaborated	the	causal	mechanisms.	The	domestic	interest	approach	
could	 be	 appropriate	 to	 explain	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 of	 liberal	 market	 economies	 with	
democratic	 politics.	 However,	 the	 three	 models	 have	 their	 respective	 limitations	 when	
directly	applied	to	explain	China’s	case.	
	 First,	 there	 is	 no	 universal	 suffrage	 and	 electoral	 campaign	 in	 China,	 which	 is	 an	
authoritarian	 state	 with	 no	 democracy	 in	 the	 top-level	 politics.	 Second,	 the	 Chinese	

















instance,	Liew	and	Wu	hold	that	China’s	civil	 society	 is	still	very	weak	and	there	 is	 limited	
political	space	that	allows	interest	groups	to	lobby	for	their	preferred	policy	outcomes.117	In	
contrast,	Steinberg	and	Shih	argue	that	the	preferences	of	powerful	interest	groups	provide	
the	 most	 convincing	 explanation	 for	 China’s	 undervalued	 exchange	 rates. 118 	The	 role	 of	
interest	groups	lobbying	in	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	making	remains	rather	inconclusive,	
which	questions	the	applicability	of	interest	group	model	to	China.	




exchange	rate	policymaking.	More	specifically,	 though	China	 is	an	authoritarian	state,	 it	 is	
worth	noting	that	this	does	not	mean	that	China’s	political	apparatus	is	a	monolithic	entity	


















In	 contrast	 to	 the	 domestic	 interests	 approach,	 the	 domestic	 institutions	 approach	
emphasizes	 institutional	 and	 structural	 impacts	 upon	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	
Institutions	matter	because	they	structure	the	way	preferences	are	aggregated	and	decisions	
are	made.	Specifically,	political	institutions	create	rules	for	decision	making,	define	priorities	
of	 agenda	and	advantage	 certain	 groups	while	disadvantaging	others.	A	number	of	 cross-













democratic	 than	 in	 nondemocratic	 polities	 and	 that	 democratic	 polities	with	majoritarian	
electoral	 systems	 are	more	 likely	 to	 fix	 their	 exchange	 rates	 than	 those	 with	 systems	 of	
proportional	representation.”120	Moreover,	Bernhard	and	Leblang	note	that	 in	the	systems	
where	“opposition	parties	are	excluded	from	the	legislative	policy	process	…	politicians	in	the	
governing	 party(ies)	 have	 strong	 incentives	 not	 to	 risk	 their	 position	 in	 office”	 and	prefer	
floating	exchange	rate	arrangements.121	
	 Though	 the	 domestic	 institutions	 approach	 provides	 generalized	 findings	 on	 the	























system122,	 are	 fundamentally	 different	 from	Western	 liberal	 democracies.	 This	 requires	 a	
more	“indigenous”	investigation	into	China’s	political	structure	and	process	of	exchange	rate	
policymaking.	
	 However,	 limited	work	 is	 dedicated	 to	 this	 important	 field.	 Liew	and	Wu	made	an	
original	contribution	 in	figuring	out	the	political	 institutions	and	elites	of	China’s	exchange	








the	 shift	 to	 the	partial	 liberalization	of	China’s	exchange	 rate	 regime	 in	2005.126	Steinberg	

















The	 black	 box,	 filled	 with	 the	 interplay	 of	 China’s	 domestic	 political	 powers,	 remains	











Contrary	 to	 the	 previous	 domestic	 politics	 approaches	 based	 on	 unit-level	 or	 state-level	
perspectives,	 the	 third	 theoretical	 approach	 –	 the	 international	 influences	 approach	 –	
attaches	 importance	 to	 the	 role	 of	 international	 influences	 on	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	












rise	 to	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 in	 2005	 and	 the	 subsequent	 RMB	 appreciation.	 For	
example,	 Li	uses	 the	 “variable	 coefficient–panel	data	model”	 to	 find	 that	 the	US	played	a	
leading	role	in	the	RMB	appreciation	and	the	Congress	bills	aimed	at	the	RMB	exchange	rate	
were	the	direct	fuse	in	the	revaluation.128	Chao	and	Tung	argue	that	in	addition	to	economic	
and	 domestic	 factors,	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 was	 influenced	 by	 American	 political	




that	 the	 RMB	 appreciation	 rate	 was	 significantly	 reduced	 in	 the	 first	 year	 after	 the	 US	

















































influences	 in	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking,	 their	 explanatory	 utility	 nonetheless	
remains	circumscribed	owing	to	their	competing	results,	just	like	the	Economics	studies.	More	
importantly,	because	China,	unlike	 Japan	 in	 the	1980s,	 is	a	more	 independent	geopolitical	
power,	it	has	more	capacity	to	resist	bowing	to	the	international	pressure	on	the	exchange	
rate.	International	influences	do	play	a	role	in	the	exchange	rate	policymaking	of	China	as	an	
open	economy,	but	 the	exchange	rate	decision	of	China	as	a	 large	economy	 is	undeniably	






As	 a	 synthesized	 perspective	 of	 the	 previous	 three	 theoretical	 approaches,	 the	 fourth	
approach	attaches	importance	to	the	international-domestic	entanglements,	which	is	heavily	
indebted	to	the	theoretical	turn	of	IR	studies	in	the	1990s.	The	IR	theories	in	the	1970s	and	







international	 institutions	 whereas	 downplayed	 unit-level	 variables.	 To	 cite	 but	 a	 few	 big	
names,	Gourevitch	introduces	the	notion	of	“the	second	image	reversed”	to	emphasize	the	
international	 sources	 of	 domestic	 politics	 and	 argues	 that	 the	 international	 systems	 are	
causes	 instead	 of	 consequences	 of	 domestic	 politics.137 	Waltz,	 the	 founder	 of	 structural	
realism	theory,	analyses	how	the	anarchic	structure	of	international	system	explains	states’	
behaviours	and	interactions	therein.138	In	particular,	he	builds	his	systemic	theory	based	on	
the	 assumption	 that	 states	 are	 rational	 and	 unitary	 actors	 only	 with	 different	 military	
capabilities	 and	 he	 overall	 neglects	 the	 domestic	 political	 economy	 of	 the	 unit	 level. 139	
Keohane	and	Nye,	 the	 founders	of	 liberal	 institutionalism	theory,	develop	the	concepts	of	






level	 game	 as	 a	metaphor	 for	 international-domestic	 interactions.141	The	 two-level	 games	















anachronistic”	 IPE-CPE	 divide	 and	 propose	 to	 “bridge	 this	 divide	 by	 using	 an	 open-polity	
model	 to	 analyse	 the	 mediating	 effects	 of	 domestic	 institutions	 between	 internationally	
driven	 changes	 in	 the	 preferences	 of	 actors	 in	 the	 private	 sphere	 and	 public	 policy	
outcomes”. 143 	Keohane	 and	 Milner	 edit	 a	 volume	 on	 “internationalization	 and	 domestic	
politics”	 and	 generally	 propose	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 that	 internationalization,	 as	 the	
central	explanatory	variable,	affects	policy	preferences	of	actors,	 their	national	policy	and	
further	 political	 institutions	 within	 countries. 144 	Milner	 also	 suggests	 that	 states	 are	 not	
unitary	actors	and	that	both	international	and	domestic	explanations	are	required	for	foreign	
policy	making.145	





complex,	 because	 systemic	 pressures	 must	 be	 translated	 through	 intervening	
unit-level	variables	such	as	decision-makers’	perceptions	and	state	structure.”146	
	 Neoclassical	 realism	 focuses	 on	 the	 interaction	 between	 international	 system	 and	













they	 emphasize	 the	 process	 whereby	 such	 intervening	 variables	 as	 the	 perceptions	 of	
decision-makers,	a	country’s	state	apparatus	and	 its	relations	to	the	society	shape	specific	
policy	response	to	international	structural	pressure.147	Neoclassical	realism	could	be	one	of	













































help	 us	 to	 understand	 the	 various	 formation	 mechanisms	 of	 exchange	 rate	 policy,	 their	
explanatory	 utility	 remains	 circumscribed	 owing	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 existing	 studies	 are	
western-centric	and	inapplicable	to	China’s	domestic	political	and	socio-economic	structures.	
Special	 consideration	 should	be	 given	 to	China’s	 political	 institutions	 characterized	by	 the	
party-state	system	and	the	policy	elites	and	economic	ministries	within	the	political	structure.	
Furthermore,	the	international	influences	approach	within	the	IPE	literature	suggests	that	the	
international	 dimension	 should	 be	 well	 incorporated	 into	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy	
analysis.	The	international-domestic	 interactions	approach,	as	a	synthesized	perspective	of	






just	 like	 the	 Economics	 studies,	 on	 exchange	 rate	 politics	 is	 not	 exhaustive.	 For	 instance,	
Kettell	establishes	a	theoretical	framework	based	on	the	“Open	Marxist	approach”	that	views	
exchange	rate	policymaking	as:	
“a	 component	 part	 of	 a	 wider	 governing	 strategy	 that	 is	 made	 by	 the	 core	
executive	 with	 a	 view	 to	 containing	 class	 struggle,	 to	 providing	 favourable	










mention	 other	 country’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 and	 whether	 the	 Open	 Marxist	
approach	 is	 appropriate	 to	 explain	 China’s	 case.	 While	 the	 open	 Marxist	 depoliticized	












are	accounts	 that	 recognize	PBOC’s	 rising	authority	 in	China’s	party-state	 system,	 the	 fact	
remains	that	the	PBOC	operates	under	the	leadership	of	the	State	Council	and	PBOC’s	policies,	












further	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 central	 bank	 independence	 is	 not	 visible	 in	 China’s	 political	








governing	 strategy	 of	 depoliticisation.	 Therefore,	 the	 use	 of	 Kettell’s	 Open	 Marxist	
depoliticized	approach	to	explain	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	is	questionable.154	
	 To	summarize,	the	above	examination	has	shown	that	the	existing	Economics	studies	
on	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 are	 inconclusive	 and	 the	 existing	 CPE	 and	 IPE	 theoretical	
approaches	 have	 limitations	 when	 applied	 to	 China’s	 case.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 critical	
review	of	the	CPE	 literature	suggests	that	special	consideration	should	be	given	to	China’s	
political	 institutions	 characterized	 by	 the	 party-state	 system	 and	 the	 policy	 elites	 and	






of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 The	 next	 section	 will	 develop	 a	 three-level	 game	



















policymaking.	 Then	more	 specific	 and	 endemic	 elements,	 such	 as	 external	 and	 domestic	
actors	with	different	preferences	and	interests	as	well	as	China’s	political	and	socio-economic	
structures,	 will	 be	 added	 into	 the	 theoretical	 framework.	 The	 analysis	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	
interactive	 dynamics	 of	 international	 politics	 and	 domestic	 politics	 in	 the	 formulation	 of	
China’s	exchange	rate	policy.	Finally	the	chapter	extends	Putnam’s	two-level	game	to	a	three-
level	game	and	develops	a	theoretical	framework	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	The	
three-level	 game	 framework	 examines	 the	 Chinese	 leadership’s	 negotiations	 with	 the	
international	 bargainers	 at	 the	 international	 level	 (level	 I),	 negotiations	 between	 central	
government’s	ministries	at	the	central	governmental	level	(level	II)	and	negotiations	with	the	
domestic	interest	groups	and	local	governments	at	the	local	level	(level	III).	It	argues	that	the	














by	 its	 place	 in	 the	 international	 system	and	 specifically	 by	 its	 relative	material	
power	capabilities	…	[T]he	impact	of	such	power	capabilities	on	foreign	policy	is	


























–	 in	mind.	On	the	other,	the	 international	 forces	prompting	a	policy	revision	are	relatively	
remote.	 Those	 disadvantaged	 in	 international	 trade	 are	 not	 very	 likely	 to	 form	 a	 serious	
retaliatory	 coalition	 or	 launch	 a	 tightly	 directed	 currency	 war	 against	 an	 exchange	 rate	
“offender”.	The	international	institutions	with	responsibility	in	this	arena,	notably	the	IMF,	














	 Therefore,	 the	 claim	 by	 neoclassical	 realists	 about	 the	 ultimate	 influence	 of	







government	 to	 adopt	 favorable	 policies,	 and	 politicians	 seek	 power	 by	
constructing	coalitions	among	those	groups.	At	the	international	 level,	national	
governments	 seek	 to	maximize	 their	own	ability	 to	 satisfy	domestic	pressures,	
while	minimizing	the	adverse	consequences	of	foreign	developments.	Neither	of	




international	 system;	or	 at	 the	 very	 least,	more	autonomy	and	 freedom	 than	many	other	
states.	Second,	China’s	domestic	considerations	could	at	times	have	greater	roles	in	directing	
the	 Chinese	 leadership’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking,	 especially	 when	 the	 international	



















Based	 on	 the	 insights	 of	 the	 two-level	 game	 framework,	 this	 part	 will	 operationalize	 the	




















Kuroda	accused	China	of	exporting	deflation	to	 its	neighbors	 [in	2002].	 Japan’s	
Finance	 Minister	 Masajuro	 Shiokawa	 argued	 that	 ‘the	 fact	 that	 the	 (RMB’s)	
exchange	 rate	 is	 extremely	 low	 vis-á-vis	 the	U.S.	 dollar	may	 be	 a	 problem’	 [in	















focus	on	 the	US	 side.	First,	 the	US	was	 the	most	 important	 source	of	pressure	on	China’s	


































































thereby	 generating	 a	 long	 list	 of	 bills	 and	 resolutions	 targeting	 on	 the	 RMB	 issue	 in	 the	
following	years	(see	Appendix	A).165	
	 Second,	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 the	 Treasury	 submits	 reports	 to	 Congress	 on	
International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	Policies	on	a	semi-annual	basis.166	The	Treasury	
analyses	 the	 exchange	 rate	 policies	 of	 America’s	 major	 trading	 partners,	 and	 considers	
whether	countries	manipulate	exchange	rate	between	their	currency	and	the	US	dollar	for	
the	 purposes	 of	 preventing	 effective	 balance	 of	 payments	 adjustments	 or	 gaining	 unfair	
competitive	advantage	in	international	trade.	In	the	last	two	decades,	though	the	Treasury	
has	never	determined	China	as	a	currency	manipulator,	 it	expressed	 its	concerns	with	the	






	 Finally,	 the	 IMF,	as	a	transnational	 liberal	regime,	undertakes	the	duty	to	“exercise	
















IMF	has	also	argued	that	 the	price	distortion	 jeopardizes	China’s	own	economy	by	 relying	























Since	 the	western-centric	 CPE	 approaches	 have	 their	 limitations	when	 directly	 applied	 to	












other	 wider	 institutional	 bodies	 in	 China’s	 political	 structure.	 According	 to	 the	 CCP	












































	 The	 PSC’s	 decisions	 are	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 information	 and	 recommendations	
provided	by	a	number	of	research	and	advisory	bodies	called	Central	Leading	Groups	[中央
领导小组].172	The	 Central	 Leading	 Groups	 are	 “ad	 hoc	 supraministerial	 coordinating	 and	
consulting	bodies	formed	to	build	consensus	on	issues	that	cut	across	the	Party,	government	










and	Wen	was	 intuitively	 the	 final	 decision	maker.	 However,	many	 observers	 and	 political	
analysts	have	suggested	that	Wen	was	not	as	dominant	in	the	bureaucracy	as	his	predecessor	























sources	 of	 policy	 inputs	 for	 policy	 deliberations	 and	 decisions	 are	 usually	 from	 PBOC,	
MOFCOM,	 NDRC	 and	 MOF.	 The	 PBOC	 and	 the	 MOFCOM	 are	 the	 two	 most	 important	







duty	 to	 maintain	 the	 steady	 price	 of	 the	 RMB.	 Therefore,	 the	 PBOC	 favours	 a	 relatively	









MOFCOM	 has	 become	 an	 opponent	 of	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 reform,	 and	 represents	 the	
interests	of	those	who	have	a	vested	interest	in	a	depreciated	and	fixed	RMB	exchange	rate	
to	maintain	the	competitiveness	of	export	sectors.176	Both	of	these	two	ministries	have	their	


































Liew	 and	 Wu	 mentioned	 that	 the	 MOF	 would	 like	 to	 reduce	 its	 loans	 to	 sub-national	
governments,	but	“appreciation	of	the	renminbi	will	very	likely	lower	the	chances	of	it	being	
successful”.179	The	reason	was	that	“renminbi	appreciation	lowers	prices	and	increases	real	





power	 and	 bargaining	 game	 between	 the	 PBOC	 and	 the	MOFCOM	are	 expected	 to	 exert	
significant	 influences	 on	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 Therefore,	 it	 would	 be	
instructive	to	compare	the	political	resources	of	these	two	institutional	actors,	such	as	their	




	 Last	 but	 not	 least,	 though	 the	political	 space	 for	 interest	 groups	 lobbying	 in	China	
remains	 controversial,	 as	 a	working	 hypothesis	 it	 is	 plausible	 to	 assume	 that	 their	 voices	
would	not	be	neglected	completely	in	the	process	of	exchange	rate	policy	making.	Firstly,	the	







provide	 substantial	political	 resources	 for	SOEs	 to	 lobby	 for	 their	 favourite	policies.181	The	
formal	channels	of	interest	representation	and	informal	patronage	networks	enable	SOEs	to	
impose	 direct	 influences	 upon	 top-level	 policy	 deliberation	 and	 decision.	 For	 instance,	
Secondly,	industry	associations	and	private	firms,	could	communicate	their	preferences	to	the	
local	 governments	 or	 bureaucracies	 such	 as	 the	 local	 branches	 of	 MOFCOM	 to	 impose	
influences	on	exchange	 rate	policy.	Partly,	 the	 reason	 is	 that	 the	 lower-level	officials	may	
speak	on	behalf	of	these	interest	groups	because	their	political	careers	are	dependent	on	the	



























of	 policy	 initiation	 and	 deliberation.	 Other	 domestic	 actors	 –	 including	 SOEs,	 industry	














international	 pressures,	 domestic	ministerial	 interests	 and	domestic	 interest	 groups	when	
making	exchange	rate	policy.	More	specifically,	the	three-level	game	(see	Figure	2.6)	refers	
to	 the	 Chinese	 leadership’s	 negotiations	with	 the	 international	 bargainers	 (mainly	 the	US	























thesis	 is	 limited	 to	 China’s	 case,	 and	 the	 problem	 of	 theoretical	 generalizability	 will	 be	
addressed	 in	 future	 comparative	 studies.	 The	 thesis	 literally	 invites	 further	 revisions	 and	





how	 the	 international	 system	and	China’s	domestic	politics	 affect	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate	
policymaking.	Neoclassical	realists	are	correct	to	emphasize	that	the	structure	of	international	
system	 conditions	 a	 country’s	 foreign	 policy	 choices,	 but	 it	 does	 not	mean	 that	 domestic	
considerations	 are	 unimportant	 or	 secondary,	 especially	 for	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	
Instead,	 the	 two-level	 game	 theory	 contends	 that	 at	 times	 domestic	 factors	 can	 exert	 a	





	 This	 section	 has	 further	 specifically	 examined	 the	 external	 factors	 and	 domestic	
sources	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	It	develops	a	three-level	game	framework	that	
sheds	 light	 on	 the	 dynamism	 and	 complexity	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 The	
three-level	 game	 refers	 to	 the	 Chinese	 leadership’s	 negotiations	 with	 the	 international	
bargainers	 (mainly	 the	 US	 government	 and	 the	 IMF)	 at	 the	 international	 level	 (level	 I),	
negotiations	between	central	government’s	ministries	(PBOC	and	MOFCOM)	at	the	central	
governmental	 level	 (level	 II)	 and	negotiations	with	 the	domestic	 interest	 groups	and	 local	
governments	 at	 the	 local	 level	 (level	 III).	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 China’s	 top	 leadership	 strives	 to	
reconcile	 international	 bargainers,	 domestic	 ministerial	 interests	 and	 domestic	 interest	
groups	when	making	the	RMB	exchange	rate	policy.	
	 It	 is	worth	noting	 that	 the	 relative	 importance	of	 the	 three	 level	 games	 remains	 a	
puzzle	 in	 the	 theoretical	 framework,	which	needs	 to	be	 further	examined	 in	 the	empirical	
study.	In	the	following	chapters	the	three-level	game	framework	will	be	applied	empirically	
through	 an	 examination	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 between	 2003	 and	 2013.	
Chapter	3	will	explore	the	initiation	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	in	2005;	Chapter	4	will	
analyse	 the	 subsequent	 development	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 from	 2005	 to	 2007;	
Chapter	 5	 will	 mainly	 investigate	 the	 interest	 group	 politics	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	between	2008	and	2010;	and	Chapter	6	will	analyse	the	resumption	of	RMB	







Based	 on	 the	 three-level	 game	 framework	 developed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 this	 chapter	 will	
empirically	examine	the	initiation	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	in	2005.	It	shows	how	the	







important	 role	 of	 agenda-setting,	 but,	 more	 importantly,	 the	 level	 II	 game	 produced	 a	
compromise	 between	 the	 PBOC	 and	 the	 MOFCOM.	 Despite	 PBOC’s	 active	 advocate	 for	
exchange	rate	reform,	Chinese	domestic	opponents	of	exchange	rate	reform,	primarily	the	
more	political	powerful	MOFCOM,	limited	the	scope	of	reform,	including	the	size	of	the	initial	
appreciation	 and	 the	 speed	 of	 subsequent	 appreciation	 following	 the	 July	 2005	
announcement.	













trade	 relations	 from	 1994	 to	 2003.	 China	 abandoned	 the	 dual	 exchange	 rate	 system	 and	
unified	 the	 RMB’s	 official	 and	 swap	 market	 rates	 to	 a	 single	 official	 rate	 in	 1994.	 China	
adopted	a	de	facto	 fixed	exchange	rate	regime184	and	kept	the	RMB	closely	pegged	to	the	
dollar	at	the	rate	of	8.28	RMB	per	dollar	from	1995.	During	the	1997-98	Asian	Financial	Crisis,	






accelerating	 accumulation	 of	 international	 reserves.	 China’s	 trade	 and	 current	 account	












be	 lost	 in	 the	US	and	China’s	exchange	 rate	policy	became	subject	 to	 sustained	American	











expensive	 for	 Chinese	 consumers	 and	 Chinese	 product	 cheaper	 for	 American	 consumers,	
which	gave	rise	 to	 the	US	trade	deficits	with	China.	The	bill	 further	asserted	that	“China’s	
undervalued	currency	and	the	United	States	trade	deficit	with	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	
















businesses.” 187 	Considering	 Chinese	 government’s	 intervention	 in	 the	 foreign	 exchange	
market	 to	 maintain	 the	 undervalued	 RMB,	 the	 bill	 accused	 that	 China	 had	 violated	 the	
principles	of	WTO	as	a	member	since	2001.	Based	on	these	findings,	the	bill	requested	that	
the	President	make	a	certification	to	the	Congress	that	China	would	no	longer	manipulate	its	
undervalued	 currency	 to	 gain	 an	unfair	 competitive	 advantage	 in	 international	 trade,	 and	
authorized	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	to	“begin	negotiations	with	the	People’s	Republic	of	
China	to	ensure	that	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	adopts	a	process	that	leads	to	a	market-




respect	 to	certain	countries	 that	engage	 in	currency	manipulation”.190	The	bill	exemplified	
China,	 Japan,	 South	 Korea	 and	 Taiwan	 as	 currency	 manipulators	 and	 highlighted	 China’s	
particular	 aggressive	 intervention	 in	 the	 foreign	 exchange	 market.	 The	 bill	 required	 the	
Treasury	 to	 collaborate	 with	 the	 IMF	 to	 determine	 whether	 any	 Asian	 country	 was	



















Treasury	 to	 submit	a	 report	 that	analysed	and	computed	 the	 rate	of	RMB’s	misalignment	






three	 bills	 in	 2003,	 S.	 RES.	 219,	 H.	 RES.	 414	 and	 S.	 RES.	 262,	 further	 urged	 the	 Treasury	

































Before	 2003,	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 regime	was	 not	 a	 core	 issue	 in	 American	 executives’	
speeches	and	meetings	with	Chinese	leaders.	However,	growing	concern	from	the	Congress	
over	the	American	manufacturing	unemployment	associated	with	undervalued	RMB	imposed	
enormous	 pressure	 on	 the	 US	 Administration	 to	 take	 action	 after	 2003.	 The	 Treasury’s	
Reports	 to	 Congress	 on	 International	 Economic	 and	 Exchange	 Rate	 Policies	 could	 be	 a	



















peg	 to	 the	dollar,	which	 it	 has	 kept	within	 a	 tight	band	 since	1995.	…	China	 continues	 to	
maintain	wide-ranging	controls	on	both	capital	outflows	and	inflows.”196	The	Reports	neither	
appreciated	 nor	 depreciated	 China’s	 dollar-pegged	 exchange	 rate	 and	 capital	 control.	
Therefore,	 the	 Reports	 rarely	 provided	 policy	 recommendations	 or	 imposed	 pressure	 on	
China’s	exchange	rate	policy.	The	only	anomaly	was	probably	the	June	2011	Report,	in	which	
“Treasury	 officials	 urged	 China	 to	 move,	 over	 time,	 to	 a	 more	 flexible	 exchange	 rate	
regime”.197 	Yet	 such	 pressure	 disappeared	 in	 the	 subsequent	 Reports	 before	 September	
2003.	




















































rest	 of	 our	 trading	 partners.	 So	 just	 as	 China	 benefits	 from	 our	 market,	 U.S.	
businesses	and	consumers	should	benefit	from	Chinas	growth.”201	
	 Snow	expressed	the	firm	belief	that	exchange	rate	flexibility	was	good	for	both	China	
and	 the	US	as	well	as	 the	 regional	and	global	 trading	partners.	However,	Snow’s	pressure	
remained	 rather	gentle.	When	explicitly	asked	whether	 the	RMB	was	undervalued	and	 its	
relationship	with	American	manufacturing	 job	 loss,	 Snow	avoided	answering	 the	question	
directly	and	vaguely	responded	that	“the	answer	is	to	place	your	confidence	in	markets.”202	
When	asked	about	the	timetable	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform,	Snow	cautiously	stated	
that	 the	 objective	 of	 China’s	 commitment	 to	 a	 more	 flexible	 exchange	 rate	 was	 more	
important	than	the	timetable:	





















	 In	 practice,	 the	 Treasury	 also	 worked	 with	 China	 to	 identify	 and	 overcome	 the	
impediments	to	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility.	The	Treasury	appointed	a	senior	financial	





but	 not	 limited	 to	 banking	 supervision,	 development	 of	 financial	 instruments	 and	 foreign	
reserve	management.207	
	 With	 regard	 to	 the	 US	 president,	 one	 can	 identify	 a	 similar	 trend.	 No	mention	 of	
China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 was	made	 in	 speeches	 or	 press	 briefings	 before	 September	
2003.208	From	September	2003	onwards,	President	Bush	started	to	frequently	raise	the	RMB	
issue	in	a	similar	way	to	Secretary	Snow.	He	stressed	the	desirability	of	flexible	exchange	rates	





























	 In	 summary,	 the	 surge	 of	 US	 trade	 deficit	 with	 China	 in	 2003	 and	 the	 rise	 of	
unemployment	in	the	US	manufacturing	sector	caused	considerable	concern	in	the	US	over	
the	RMB	exchange	rate,	which	was	considered	to	give	an	unfair	trade	advantage	to	China.	
From	 then	 on,	 Congressmen	 introduced	 bills	 against	 China’s	 currency	 regime	 in	 the	 US	
Congress.	They	called	 for	substantive	RMB	revaluation	 in	 the	short	 run	and	marked-based	
exchange	 rate	 in	 the	 long	 run.	 Treasury	 Secretary	 Snow	and	US	President	Bush	have	 also	









rather	 cautious	 and	 gentle	 stance.	 They	 emphasized	 the	 constructive	 and	 collaborative	
approach	 adopted	 by	 Chinese	 and	 American	 leaders.	 The	 external	 influences	 of	 the	 US	
government	played	an	agenda-setting	role,	which	rendered	China’s	leaders	unable	to	avoid	






















































the	 Chinese	 authorities.”215	In	 the	 2004	 annual	meetings	 of	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	World	 Bank	
Group,	when	asked	what	was	the	direction	and	objective	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform,	Zhou	
stated	 that	 it	was	“to	 improve	 the	RMB	exchange	rate	mechanism	and	maintain	 the	RMB	
exchange	rate	at	a	reasonable	and	equilibrium	level.”216	When	requested	to	further	explain	







incorporate	 representatives	 of	 other	ministries	 on	 the	 critical	 issues	 in	 China’s	monetary	















demonstrate	PBOC’s	 reformist	orientation.219	Yu	 served	as	 the	Director	of	 the	 Institute	of	









































Theoretically	 the	 MOFCOM	 incorporates	 a	 diverse	 and	 inherently	 contradictory	 set	 of	
interests	 in	 relation	 to	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate.	However,	practically	 the	MOFCOM	placed	






















































were	 only	 two	 bills	 and	 resolutions	 (H.	 R.	 4986	 and	 H.	 CON.	 RES.	 498)	 targeting	 China’s	
currency	in	2004	and	both	bills	essentially	did	not	add	new	point	to	the	bills	of	2003.229	The	




























a	 more	 flexible,	 market-based	 exchange	 rate	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 Administration’s	
engagement	with	China	is	yielding	results.”232	





























between	 the	US	and	China,	 this	 could	be	 taken	as	a	 significant	escalation	of	 the	 currency	
dispute	between	Washington	and	Beijing.	Furthermore,	the	bill	H.	R.	1498	Chinese	Currency	
Act	 of	 2005	was	 introduced	 on	 April	 6	 to	 clarify	 that	 China’s	 currency	manipulation	 was	
actionable,	 considering	 China	 had	 given	 no	 indication	 of	 any	 intent	 to	 correct	 the	 RMB’s	
undervaluation	in	the	foreseeable	future.235	




























Furthermore,	 from	 this	 report	 onwards,	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 was	 systematically	
analysed	at	the	beginning	of	the	report	as	a	“key	finding”.	
	 Finally,	 like	 the	 US	 administration,	 the	 IMF	 adopted	 an	 increasingly	 tough	 stance	




economy.	 In	response	to	China’s	concerns	about	the	 impact	on	China’s	economy,	 the	 IMF	
staff	 changed	 the	 view	 of	 2004	 and	 argued	 in	 2005	 that	 the	 effects	 on	 growth	 and	












































	 Bo’s	 tough	 stance	 towards	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate	 issue	was	 reflected	not	only	 in	
domestic	 policy	 deliberations	 but	 also	 in	 international	 negotiations.	 In	 the	 APEC	 Trade	
Ministers’	Meeting	 in	early	 June	2005	Bo	argued	 that	Europe	and	America’s	 link	between	
China’s	 textile	 exports	 and	 RMB	 revaluation	 made	 the	 issues	 more	 complicated	 and	
controversial.243	He	 also	 declared	 that	 China	would	 not	 yield	 to	 trade	protectionism	 from	


























of	 export	 sectors,	 at	 this	 stage	 there	 were	 few	 signs	 of	 direct	 lobbying	 from	 export	


























based	 exchange	 rate	 regime	 but	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 they	 were	 also	 concerned	 with	 the	
































emphasized	 that	China	would	not	be	 subject	 to	 external	 pressure	 to	 revalue	 the	RMB	on	
various	 occasions. 251 	He	 even	 further	 asserted	 that	 RMB	 revaluation	 was	 an	 issue	 that	
involved	China’s	sovereignty:	
“RMB	exchange	rate	reform	is	China’s	sovereignty.	Each	country	has	the	right	to	



























on	China’s	national	 conditions;	 controllability	means	 that	exchange	 rate	 reform	should	be	





PBOC	 announced	 that	 China	would	 implement	 a	managed	 floating	 exchange	 rate	 regime	
based	on	market	demand	and	supply	with	reference	to	a	basket	of	currencies.	Furthermore,	




	 This	 policy	 outcome	 should	 be	 interpreted	 as	 Chinese	 top	 leaders’	 reconciliation	
between	the	international	and	domestic	bargainers.	The	US	government	raised	concerns	with	
the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 issue	 after	 September	 2003,	 and	 the	 international	 criticism	 and	





















politically	powerful	Minister	Bo	Xilai,	was	 considered	 far	more	 influential	over	 the	 central	
government’s	decision-making	than	the	PBOC.	
	 Chinese	 domestic	 opponents	 of	 exchange	 rate	 reform,	 primarily	 in	 the	MOFCOM,	




of	 subsequent	 appreciation	 was	 to	 be	 relatively	 stable	 and	 slow.	 In	 retrospect,	 the	








international	 pressure	 and	 domestic	 bargainers	 when	 making	 the	 exchange	 rate	 policy	
decisions	in	2005.	Specifically,	international	influences	played	an	agenda-setting	role	in	both	
the	 2005	 exchange	 rate	 reform.	 However,	 the	 international	 influences	 were	 strongly	
mitigated	by	China’s	domestic	politics.	China’s	ministerial	politics,	in	which	the	MOFCOM	was	
more	politically	powerful	 than	 the	PBOC,	determined	 the	 limited	nature	of	exchange	 rate	
reform.	The	RMB	depeg	from	the	US	dollar	in	July	2005	was	a	watershed	in	China’s	exchange	















reform	from	July	2005	 to	2007.	 It	 is	argued	 that	with	softened	 international	pressure	and	
MOFCOM’s	 sustained	 resistance	 against	 RMB	 appreciation	 from	 July	 2005	 to	 2006,	 the	
gradually	 and	 continuously	 appreciated	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 ultimately	 eroded	 PBOC’s	
monetary	 policy	 autonomy.	 However,	 the	 situation	 changed	 dramatically	 in	 2007.	
Internationally,	 external	 pressure	 for	 accelerated	 RMB	 appreciation	 regained	momentum.	
Domestically,	the	MOFCOM	also	shifted	priority	from	maintaining	export	growth	to	reducing	
excessive	 trade	 surplus	 owing	 to	 the	 large	 amounts	 of	 trade	 frictions	 in	 2006.	Under	 the	
circumstances,	 the	PBOC	was	endowed	with	more	political	space	 for	advocating	exchange	













































































exchange	 market	 though	 they	 emphasized	 that	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 would	 have	 to	 be	
gradual	and	controllable.	The	IMF	advocated	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility	and	aimed	to	
address	China’s	concern	with	 the	potential	negative	 impact	of	 substantial	appreciation	on	
China’s	economy.	On	the	one	hand,	the	staff	did	not	accept	the	analogy	that	China	would	
embrace	a	 lost	decade	 like	Japan	 in	the	manner	that	a	significant	RMB	appreciation	could	
push	 the	 economy	 into	 deflation	 and	 prolonged	 recession.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 staff	
stressed	 that	 exchange	 rate	 flexibility,	 not	 just	 appreciation,	 was	 imperative	 for	 China’s	









	 To	 summarise,	 though	 the	 Treasury	 was	 not	 satisfied	 with	 the	 pace	 of	 China’s	
exchange	 rate	 reform	 and	 maintained	 the	 engagements	 with	 the	 Chinese	 leadership,	
international	pressure	from	the	Congress	and	the	IMF	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	generally	
decreased	 from	 July	 2005	 to	 2016.	 It	 reinforced	 the	 argument	 that	 international	 factors	
played	an	agenda-setting	role	in	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	while	China’s	domestic	
politics	 determined	 the	 pathway	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate	 reform.	 In	 other	 words,	 external	



















impact	 of	 RMB	 appreciation	 on	 exports	 was	 also	 limited,	 with	 only	 6.6%	 of	 the	 sample	
enterprises	 cutting	 down	 export	 production	 and	 13.7%	 transferring	 exports	 to	 domestic	
sales.261	2005	Fourth	Quarter	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	found	that	enterprises	
were	 generally	 adapted	 to	 the	 new	 exchange	 rate	 regime,	 as	 exports	 and	 export	 orders	
continued	to	grow	and	most	enterprises	used	various	exchange	rate	hedging	instruments	to	
eliminate	their	foreign	exchange	risks.262	The	report	concluded	that	the	new	RMB	exchange	







initial	 revaluation	 was	 modest	 and	 the	 subsequent	 appreciation	 was	 very	 slow,	 China’s	


















appreciation	 imposed	 different	 impacts	 on	 different	 enterprises.	 More	 specifically,	 the	
enterprises	that	procured	raw	materials	in	the	domestic	market	and	exported	products	to	the	




12%,	 wool	 textile	 industry	 8%,	 and	 apparel	 industry	 about	 13%.265 	At	 the	 end	 of	 2005,	
statistics	 showed	 that	 the	 growth	 rate	 of	 textile	 exports	 had	 been	 in	 decline,	 and	 the	
MOFCOM	claimed	that	“the	continuous	RMB	appreciation	was	a	real	threat	to	exports.”266	
The	MOFCOM	took	a	rather	firm	stance	towards	the	negative	impacts	of	RMB	appreciation	




















Saving	 Cooperation,	 Bo	 made	 public	 remarks	 that	 “RMB	 appreciation	 has	 substantially	









	 Though	 the	MOFCOM	strongly	advocated	 for	 the	 interests	of	export	 sectors,	 there	

















pay	 close	attention	 to	 the	 slowly	appreciating	exchange	 rate.	 The	domestic	economy	was	
growing	quickly	at	the	rate	of	12.7%	in	2006.271	Moreover,	tradable	producers	were	making	
additional	 profits	 from	 investing	 in	 China’s	 booming	 real	 estate	 and	 stock	 markets.	 For	
instance,	the	stock	market	entered	a	period	of	hyper-growth,	which	saw	the	Shanghai	Stock	
Exchange	Composite	more	than	double	in	the	year	of	2006.	










leadership.	 This	 section	 will	 elaborate	 that	 the	 PBOC	 faced	 rising	 challenges	 from	 rapid	
expansion	of	domestic	money	supply	in	the	process	of	RMB	exchange	rate	management.	The	












RMB	 exchange	 rate	 ultimately	 eroded	 PBOC’s	 monetary	 policy	 autonomy,	 under	 the	
circumstance	that	China	ran	persistent	current	account	surpluses.	
	 An	explanation	of	the	causal	mechanism	should	start	from	China’s	foreign	exchange	




exchange	 surrender	 and	 purchase	 system	 [银行结售汇制度].273	Firms	 were	 required	 to	
surrender	their	foreign	exchange	earnings	from	current	account	transactions	and	purchase	
foreign	 exchange	 from	 a	 foreign	 exchange	 designated	 bank	 when	 a	 payment	 in	 foreign	
currency	was	needed.	Foreign-funded	enterprises	were	also	included	in	the	foreign	exchange	
surrender	 and	 purchase	 system	 after	 1996.	 Furthermore,	 a	 national	 inter-bank	 foreign	
exchange	market	was	established	to	link	all	the	designated	banks	and	to	terminate	the	foreign	
exchange	 swap	 business	 in	 the	 local	 and	 unlinked	 swap	 centres.	 In	 particular,	 the	 PBOC	
determined	a	benchmark	rate	that	reflected	the	market	conditions,	and	all	designated	foreign	
















appreciated	 against	 the	 dollar,	 the	 PBOC	 needed	 to	 intervene	 massively	 in	 the	 foreign	
exchange	market,	 selling	 the	RMB	and	buying	 the	dollar.	However,	 in	doing	 so,	 it	directly	


























































































































































to	 two	 tools	 of	monetary	 policy,	 open	market	 operations	 and	 reserve	 requirement	 ratio.	
These	two	monetary	policy	tools	and	the	corresponding	money	supply	will	be	examined	as	
follows	to	demonstrate	that	the	regime	of	limited	exchange	rate	flexibility	and	the	pathway	




















































































































































































































































reducing	 reserves	 in	 the	 banking	 system	 and	 tightening	 money	 supply,	 and	 then	 after	 a	






adjusting	 the	 base	 money,	 they	 were	 ultimately	 constrained	 by	 the	 limited	 amounts	 of	





the	PBOC	converted	all	 the	undue	 repo,	 in	 the	 form	of	PBOC’s	assets	held	by	commercial	
banks,	to	central	bank	bills,	in	the	form	of	PBOC’s	liabilities.	It	was	manifestly	stated	that	the	



































	 In	addition	to	open	market	operations,	 it	 is	also	necessary	to	examine	the	required	




























forex	 purchase.	 In	 retrospect,	 Zhou	 Xiaochuan	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 the	 main	 tasks	 and	
challenges	 of	 China’s	 monetary	 policy	 in	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 were	 to	 manage	 the	
exchange	rates	by	 intervention	 in	the	foreign	exchange	rate	market	and	to	sterilize	excess	
liquidity	by	open	market	operations	and	required	reserve	ratio	adjustments	simultaneously,	
but	 what	 he	 did	 not	 specify	 was	 that	 PBOC’s	 monetary	 policy	 autonomy	 was	 heavily	
constrained.280	
	 To	 summarize,	 the	 PBOC	 faced	 an	 increasing	 policy	 dilemma	 in	 simultaneously	





exchange	rate	reform	on	21	 July	2005,	which	required	the	PBOC	to	engage	 in	 larger	scale	
intervention	 in	 the	 inter-bank	 foreign	 exchange	 market	 and	 sterilization	 in	 the	 domestic	
money	market.	On	the	one	hand,	the	PBOC	issued	central	bank	bills	to	commercial	banks,	
which	involved	straightforward	commercial	bank	purchase	of	interest-bearing	papers	issued	
by	 the	PBOC.	On	 the	other,	 the	PBOC	 raised	 the	 required	 reserve	 ratio,	 and	 the	 share	of	
deposits	 that	 commercial	 banks	must	 place	 at	 the	 central	 bank.	 Both	methods	 sought	 to	
sterilize	 the	 increasing	 position	 for	 forex	 purchase	 through	 expansion	 of	 central	 bank	








PBOC’s	control,	which	remained	at	very	high	 levels	and	ultimately	caused	 inflations	 in	 the	
time	period.	 In	a	nutshell,	with	the	overriding	policy	target	of	gradual	and	continued	RMB	




























clause	 that	 a	 retaliatory	 tariff	 of	 27.5	 percent	would	 be	 imposed	 on	 all	 China’s	 products	
entering	the	US	if	China	continued	to	manipulate	its	currency.283	This	is	similar	to	the	three	





































rate	 policy	 became	 tougher	 as	 well,	 which	 could	 be	 seen	 from	 the	 blunter	 language	 of	
Treasury’s	Reports.	The	comparison	of	2006	and	2007	Treasury’s	Reports	would	reveal	the	
evolution	 towards	 Treasury’s	 stronger	 criticism	 and	 bolder	 arguments.	 Specifically,	 the	
Treasury	 still	 used	 “limited	 exchange	 rate	 flexibility”	 and	 “China’s	 cautious	 approach	 to	
exchange	rate	reform”	in	the	December	2006	Report.284	However,	it	was	only	in	June	2007	
that	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 the	Treasury	 came	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 “the	Chinese	 currency	 is	














































priority	 in	 2007.	 The	 MOFCOM	 used	 to	 be	 a	 vocal	 opponent	 of	 RMB	 appreciation	 and	






out	 that	 China’s	 excessive	 trade	 surplus	 was	 detrimental	 to	 both	 domestic	 economic	
development	and	foreign	trade	relations.	He	commented	that	“the	expanding	trade	surplus	
had	evolved	into	a	prominent	problem”	as	it	triggered	more	frequent	trade	frictions.290	In	the	
National	 Commercial	 Work	 Conference	 [全国商务工作会议 ]	 on	 15	 January	 2007,	 Bo	
explicitly	stated	that	reducing	trade	surplus	was	the	top	priority	of	the	year’s	foreign	trade	
development	 and	 saw	 it	 as	 an	 opportunity	 for	 China	 to	 upgrade	 its	 lower	 value-added	
processing	trade	and	optimize	export	structure.291	One	week	 later,	Fu	Ziying	 [傅自应],	 the	
Assistant	Minister	of	Commerce,	echoed	Minister	Bo’s	emphasis	on	the	international	trade	

















Secondly,	 the	 report	 recognized	 the	 important	 role	of	 exchange	 rate	 leverage	 in	 relieving	
international	 trade	 imbalances	and	speculative	 foreign	exchange	 influx.	Thirdly,	 the	report	
claimed	that	the	RMB	exchange	rate	would	face	greater	pressure	to	appreciate	in	the	future	
and	suggested	“moderate	appreciation”,	which	means	that	the	RMB	exchange	rate	continued	
























also	quality	of	economic	growth.	The	 tone	 for	macroeconomic	policies	 in	2007	was	set	as	
“good	and	fast	economic	development”	[国民经济又好又快发展]	and	emphasis	was	placed	
on	balanced	and	coordinated	development.	It	was	the	first	time	that	good	quality	of	economic	







MOFCOM’s	 shifted	 priority	 on	 the	 balance	 of	 international	 payments	 and	 the	 central	
leadership’s	 emphasis	 on	 economic	 balancing	 provided	 significant	 political	 space	 for	














current	 account	 surplus	 and	 capital	 inflows.	 The	 PBOC	 faced	 increasing	 and	 enormous	




The	required	reserve	ratios	and	the	benchmark	deposit	and	 lending	 rates	were	raised	 ten	
times	 and	 five	 times	 respectively	 in	 2007.297	Under	 these	 circumstances,	 the	 PBOC	more	
actively	advocated	 to	push	 forward	exchange	 rate	 reform	 for	greater	 flexibility	and	 faster	
appreciation	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	in	2007.	
	 Zhou	Xiaochuan	expressed	severe	concern	regarding	China’s	domestic	excess	liquidity,	
and	 declared	 that	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 flexibility	 should	 be	 expanded	 if	 China’s	 trade	
surplus	continued	to	grow	at	the	Bank	for	International	Settlements	conference	in	January	
2007.298	One	week	later,	Hu	Xiaolian,	a	deputy	governor	of	PBOC	and	the	director	of	SAFE,	




















exchange	 rate	 policy,	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 price	 lever,	 would	 play	 a	 complementary	 role	 in	 the	
economic	 restructuring	 and	 trade	 balancing	 at	 the	 press	 conference	 of	 the	 annual	 NPC	
meeting.300	A	few	days	later,	Zhou	expressed	the	message	that	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	
would	 be	more	market-oriented:	 “RMB	 exchange	 rate	will	 depend	 on	market	 supply	 and	
demand	and	there	is	no	pre-determined	target	level.”301	Yi	Gang	[易纲],	the	PBOC	assistant	
governor,	explicitly	pointed	out	that	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility	and	RMB	appreciation	




















































dilemma	mentioned	above,	 they	would	be	more	 likely	 to	 support	 the	 “too	much	money”	
hypothesis	 in	explaining	the	Chinese	 inflationary	cycle	 in	2007.	Figure	4.6	shows	the	rising	































China's monthly CPI in 2007
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	 Under	 the	 circumstance,	 the	 PBOC	 expressed	 serious	 concerns	 with	 inflation	 on	
various	occasions,	not	only	in	monetary	policy	implementation	reports	but	also	in	officials’	
public	 remarks.	 The	 PBOC	 recognized	 that	 the	 continuous	 rising	 of	 trade	 surplus	 and	 CPI	
exacerbated	the	inflationary	expectations	and	intensified	the	inflationary	pressure.307	Zhou	
































meeting,	 the	 Central	 Politburo	 recognized	 the	 several	 problems	 of	 China’s	 economy	 and	
proposed	“to	prevent	 relatively	 fast	economic	growth	 from	becoming	overheated”,	which	
was	made	as	the	top	priority	of	macroeconomic	management.	Specifically,	efforts	should	be	
made	to	ease	the	growth	of	investment,	credit	expansion,	CPI	and	trade	surplus.312	However,	

























inflation	 was	 the	 primary	 concern	 of	 current	 macroeconomic	 management,	 and	 that	
monetary	 tightening	 and	 RMB	 appreciation	 would	 be	 the	 most	 effective	 ways	 to	 fight	
inflation.316	








This	 chapter	has	 examined	 the	 subsequent	development	of	China’s	 exchange	 rate	 reform	
from	 July	 2005	 to	 2007.	 With	 softened	 international	 pressure	 and	MOFCOM’s	 sustained	















little	 progress	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 reform,	 and	 the	 external	 pressure	 regained	
momentum	in	2007,	which	once	again	played	an	agenda-setting	role	to	push	China’s	leaders	
























exchange	 rate	 appreciated	 in	 a	 gradual	 manner	 after	 the	 July	 2005	 announcement,	 and	
PBOC’s	 monetary	 policy	 autonomy	 was	 severely	 eroded,	 as	 the	 central	 bank	 needed	 to	
maintain	the	gradually	and	continuously	appreciated	exchange	rate.	The	situation	changed	
dramatically	 in	 2007.	 Internationally,	 the	 US	 government	 and	 the	 IMF	 were	 increasingly	
impatient	and	critical	of	the	slow	progress	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform.	Domestically,	in	
the	face	of	growing	trade	friction,	the	MOFCOM	shifted	its	priority	to	trade	surplus	reduction	
















appreciation	 in	 early	 2008,	 as	 the	 pace	 of	 appreciation	 had	 accelerated.	 In	 truth,	 RMB	
appreciation	 was	 only	 one	 of	 a	 number	 of	 different	 factors	 that	 were	 squeezing	 these	
industries.	 Other	 policy	 changes,	 such	 as	 cuts	 in	 export	 tax	 rebates	 and	 the	 new	 labour	
contract	law,	as	well	as	the	simultaneous	declines	in	the	domestic	stock	and	property	markets,	






on	 the	 Fujian	 province	 as	 a	 case	 study	 and	 explores	 the	 three	 main	 methods	 of	 export	
lobbying	in	the	level	III	game:	first	guanxi-based	lobbying	through	local	governments,	second	
guanxi-based	 lobbying	 through	 local	 offices	 of	 central	 governmental	 agencies,	 and	 third	
lobbying	 through	 trade	 associations.	 It	 argues	 that	 the	 exporters’	 lobbying	 imposed	
considerable	pressure	on	the	central	government’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	 in	the	first	
















Treasury	 to	 deal	 with	 China’s	 currency	 manipulation,	 including	 making	 a	 determination,	
setting	benchmarks	and	timeframes,	initiate	bilateral	negotiations	with	China	and	coordinate	
with	 the	 IMF	 to	 address	 the	 RMB	misalignment	 and	 US-China	 trade	 imbalance.318	In	 the	
December	2007	and	May	2008	Reports,	the	Treasury	recognized	that	the	RMB	appreciation	
accelerated	 against	 the	 dollar	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 2007	 and	 the	 pace	 of	 appreciation	
increased	 further	 in	 the	 early	 months	 of	 2008.319 	The	 Treasury	 regarded	 China’s	 recent	
acceleration	 in	 RMB	 appreciation	 as	 a	 welcome	 development	 and	 encouraged	 China	 to	
continue	 the	 exchange	 rate	 reform.	Overall,	 the	 international	 discussions	 and	 criticism	of	
Chinese	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 were	 significantly	 lower	 after	 the	 18	 May	 2007	 reform,	
especially	in	the	few	months	preceding	the	2008	global	financial	crisis.	
	 The	softened	international	pressure	in	2008	implies	that	the	Chinese	leadership	would	






















	 With	 mounting	 inflationary	 pressure,	 the	 PBOC	 implemented	 the	 tight	 monetary	
policy	by	raising	the	required	reserve	ratio	five	times	by	3%	(see	Appendix	C)	and	allowed	the	
RMB	a	 faster	 rate	of	 appreciation	 in	 the	 first	half	of	2008.	As	 the	 central	bank,	 the	PBOC	












































































































exchange	 rate	 flexibility	 and	 appreciation	 is	 to	 improve	 the	 market-oriented	





the	 demand	 to	 accelerate	 appreciation	 to	 reduce	 trade	 surplus,	 Minister	 Chen	 Deming	
responded	 firmly	 that	 it	was	unreasonable	 to	 require	a	RMB	devaluation	based	purely	on	
trade	 surplus.	 He	 reaffirmed	 that	 China	would	 not	 deliberately	 pursue	 trade	 surplus,	 and	
















the	 dollar	 for	 more	 than	 two	 years.	 The	 substantial	 and	 faster	 RMB	 appreciation	 only	

























































































































































trade,	 according	 to	 the	 questionnaires	 collected	 from	 Fujian’s	 entrepreneurs.	 More	 than	
three-quarters	(49	out	of	63)	of	the	export	enterprises	 in	Fujian	responded	that	they	used	
dollar	 as	 the	 main	 currency	 for	 international	 trade	 settlement.	 Thus,	 their	 business	 was	






































	 Figure	 5.7	 demonstrates	 the	 response	 number	 of	 Fujian’s	 enterprises	 that	 were	
greatly	affected	by	RMB	exchange	rate	fluctuations.	As	to	the	question	“In	which	year(s)	your	






























2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Q: In which year(s) your enterprise was significantly affected
by the RMB exchange rate fluctuations?
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	 Figure	5.8	shows	the	measures	 taken	by	export	entrepreneurs	 in	a	 time	of	volatile	





























	 The	questionnaires	 further	explored	 the	degree	of	difficulty	and	effectiveness	with	
which	 the	 export	 entrepreneurs	 communicated	 with	 local	 governments	 and	 trade	
associations	in	a	time	of	volatile	exchange	rate	fluctuations.	According	to	the	responses	of	


























1	Very	dififcult 2	Dificult 3	Moderate 4	Easy 5	Very	easy
Q: How difficult do you find it to communicate with local







































Q: How effective do you find it to communicate with local














many	 labour-intensive	 export	 enterprises	 fell	 into	 a	 dilemma	 in	 the	 face	 of	 currency	
appreciation	and	cuts	in	export	rebates,	as	they	had	limited	bargaining	power:	to	raise	the	
prices	could	 lead	 to	 loss	of	orders,	whereas	not	 to	 raise	 the	prices	may	 lead	 to	 their	own	
enormous	loss.330	This	was	why	there	was	a	small	number	(7	out	of	63)	of	entrepreneurs	who	





around	 one	 percent.	 However,	 the	 RMB	 appreciated	 6.5%	 against	 the	 dollar,	
giving	 rise	 to	 around	10%	profit	 loss	 in	 2007.	 The	RMB	appreciation	was	even	















the	US	 increased	29.69%	and	33.06%	 respectively	 in	 the	 first	quarter	of	2008.333	As	many	























































	 As	 China’s	 political	 system	 evaluated	 the	 local	 cadre	 primarily	 in	 terms	 of	 local	
economic	 performance,	 it	 created	 strong	 incentives	 for	 the	 local	 government	 leaders	 to	
ensure	 local	economic	growth.341	In	 response	 to	 these	complaints	and	pressures	 from	the	
local	 entrepreneurs,	 the	 local	 government	 officials	 visited	 the	 local	 garment	 and	 shoe	
manufactories	from	time	to	time,	usually	every	month	in	the	first	half	of	2008,	to	find	out	



















policy.	 The	 RMB	 appreciation	 should	 slow	 down	 moderately.	 Industrial	
transformation	and	upgrading	is	necessary,	but	should	be	pushed	in	a	steady	way.	
In	the	process	government	should	implement	large	amounts	of	investment	funds	
to	 support	 R&D	 and	 innovation.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 process	 of	 export	 structure	
adjustment	should	be	market-oriented,	rather	than	based	on	the	administrative	
emphasis	on	high-end	technology.	It	is	important	to	prevent	the	rapid	shrinking	
of	 traditional	 labour-intensive	 exports,	 which	 may	 trigger	 a	 large	 number	 of	
business	failures	and	corresponding	unemployment.”342	
	 The	 fieldwork	 further	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 local	
politics	and	local	economic	actors.	This	suggests	that	the	provincial	government	in	many	ways	
is	not	 really	 local	 in	any	meaningful	way,	and	that	 really	“local”	politics	 takes	place	at	 the	
prefecture	and	county	levels.	Brown	recognizes	that	“local	officials	were	on	the	front	line	in	
relationships	between	one	of	the	most	difficult	groups	in	contemporary	China,	the	farmers,	
and	 the	state.”343	This	 is	 true	 for	prefecture	and	county-level	governments.	The	provincial	












(guanxi)	 to	 discuss	 their	 difficulties	 with	 local	 officials	 of	 central	 government	 agencies,	







	 As	with	 the	 local	 government	 leaders,	 the	political	 achievements	of	officials	 in	 the	
MOFCOM’s	regional	branches	depended	at	least	in	part	on	the	flourishing	of	China’s	export	
sector.345	In	 the	 first	half	of	2008,	several	MOFCOM’s	regional	branches,	 including	but	not	
limited	to	Jiangsu,	Guangdong,	Shanghai	and	Liaoning,	conducted	field	research	to	empirically	
analyse	 the	 impact	 of	 RMB	 appreciation	 on	 different	 industries	 in	 different	 regions.	 The	
research	reports	generally	echoed	local	interests	and	became	important	policy	inputs	for	the	









“In	 the	 following	 six	 months,	 a	 6.15%	 appreciation	 of	 RMB	 against	 the	 dollar	
would	impose	serious	impacts	on	the	textile	and	garment	export	enterprises	in	
Jiangsu.	 First,	 the	 textile	 and	 garment	 export	 growth	would	 decrease	 to	 zero.	
Second,	there	would	be	significant	decline	in	profits	of	textile	and	garment	export	






exports	 of	 Guangdong	 province	 would	 drop	 2.37	 percent,	 the	 exports	 of	 general	 trade	
enterprises	would	drop	5.79	percent	and	the	exports	of	process	trade	enterprises	would	drop	
1.44	 percent.”347 	It	 was	 also	 explicitly	 suggested	 that	 “the	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 should	
proceed	as	gradually	as	possible,	rather	than	in	one	step,	so	that	export	enterprises	would	














	 However,	 it	 is	worth	pointing	out	that	although	the	guanxi-based	 lobbying	through	
local	 governments	 and	 local	 offices	 of	 central	 governmental	 agencies	 was	 direct	 and	
straightforward,	 it	 took	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 time	 to	 influence	 central	 government’s	
exchange	rate	policy	making.	As	confirmed	by	several	interviewees,	the	various	levels	of	local	
governments	 in	 China’s	 administrative	 divisions	 became	 the	 major	 obstacle. 349 	It	 was	
conventional	wisdom	that	it	was	easier	to	engage	with	the	lower	levels	of	local	governments	
directly	 and	 more	 difficult	 to	 reach	 the	 higher	 levels	 of	 local	 governments.	 However,	 it	
definitely	took	time	to	transfer	information	from	county-level	or	municipal	governments	to	
provincial	governments,	and	further	to	the	central	government.	For	instance,	the	RMB	began	
to	appreciate	against	 the	dollar	at	a	 faster	pace	 in	 the	 fourth	quarter	of	2007.	The	Fujian	
provincial	government’s	economic	report	was	drafted	 in	May	2008,	which	took	more	than	
half	 a	 year	 in	 total.	 The	 reports	 on	 RMB	 appreciation	 and	 enterprise	 competitiveness	 by	





















large	 quantities	 of	 labour-intensive	 enterprises	would	 go	 bankrupt,	 thousands	 of	workers	
would	be	laid	off,	and	the	social	stability	would	therefore	be	threatened.	As	one	of	the	most	
severely	hit	industries,	the	textile	industry	was	a	typical	example	of	this	case.	
	 As	 confirmed	by	 several	 interviewees,	 the	 textile	and	garments	exporters	 in	Fujian	
began	 to	 actively	 seek	 policy	 adjustments	 through	 two	 trade	 associations:	 Fujian	 Textile	
Industry	Association	 (FTIA)	 [福建省纺织行业协会]	 and	 Fujian	Chamber	of	 Commerce	 for	
Import	and	Export	(FCCIE)	[福建省进出口商会].	FTIA	established	itself	as	a	bridge	between	
government	 and	 enterprises.350 	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 FTIA	 conveyed	 the	 national	 economic	
policies	 to	 the	member	enterprises;	 on	 the	other	hand,	 FTIA	 represented	 the	 interests	of	
member	 enterprises,	 and	 communicated	 more	 effectively	 with	 governments	 and	 other	
organizations.	More	 importantly,	 FTIA	 collaborated	 horizontally	with	 trade	 associations	 in	
other	provinces,	such	as	Jiangsu	Textile	Association	and	Guangdong	Textile	Association,	to	
jointly	collect	the	information	that	the	local	export	enterprises	faced	enormous	difficulties	in	









Apparel	Council	 (CNTAC)	 [中国纺织工业协会],	 as	 the	national	 textile	 industry	association	
centred	 at	 Beijing,	 formed	 six	 research	 teams	 to	 tour	 six	 typical	 provinces	 to	 survey	 the	
situations	of	the	local	textile	industries	in	early	March	2008.	The	six	provinces	were	Jiangsu,	
Fujian,	 Zhejiang,	 Shandong,	Guangdong,	 and	Hebei,	whose	 textile	 exports	 represented	 85	
percent	of	the	total.	After	the	survey,	CNTAC	representatives	concluded	that	the	profit	margin	




industry	 to	13	percent	and	4	percent	adjustment	of	 the	export	 tax	 rebate	 rate	of	apparel	
industry	to	15	percent,	so	as	to	give	the	textile	industry	a	chance	to	weather	the	difficulties.353	
	 The	 other	 channel	 of	 lobbying	 was	 through	 chambers	 of	 commerce.	 FCCIE	 was	
established	 in	2003	to	represent	 the	 interests	of	member	enterprises	and	to	promote	the	
development	 of	 international	 trade	 in	 Fujian. 354 	According	 to	 a	 FCCIE	 official,	 the	
representatives	in	the	FCCIE	mainly	included	entrepreneurs	from	export	companies	as	well	as	
retired	governmental	officials	who	previously	held	senior-level	positions	in	the	MOFCOM	or	












for	 policies	 in	 favour	 of	 their	 interests. 355 	They	 could	 not	 only	 communicate	 with	 the	
incumbent	 provincial	 level	 government	 leaders,	 but	 also	 put	 the	 case	 forward	 to	 higher	
chamber	of	commerce.	
	 In	 response	 to	 the	 appeals	 of	 local	 chambers	 of	 commerce,	 China	 Chamber	 of	



























MOFCOM,	also	proposed	 that	“China	must	 stabilize	exports	of	 labour-intensive	 industries,	
especially	the	steady	growth	of	textile	and	garment	trade,	to	allow	time	for	product	upgrade	
and	industrial	transformation.”359	In	late	May,	China’s	Ministry	of	Industry	and	Information	
Technology	 issued	an	opinion	 letter	which	 strove	 to	 the	alleviate	 the	difficulties	of	 textile	
industry,	and	also	sought	suggestions	and	recommendations	from	NDRC,	MOFCOM,	PBOC,	
CNTAC	 and	 other	 organizations.	 The	 recommendations	 mainly	 referred	 to	 adjusting	 the	




The	 central	 government	 faced	 considerable	 pressure	 to	 raise	 export	 rebate	 rates	 and	
maintain	the	stability	of	RMB	exchange	rate.	Furthermore,	information	from	various	channels	
on	 decline	 of	 exports,	 unfavourable	 employment	 situation,	 and	 failure	 of	 businesses	
frequently	reached	the	central	government.	This	was	no	longer	merely	an	economic	problem,	
















and	 entrepreneurs	 from	 the	 electronic	 and	 textile	 industries.	 Wen	 heard	 about	 their	
difficulties	and	discussed	ways	to	overcome	the	difficulties	with	the	heads	of	enterprises.361	
	 The	then	vice-president	Xi	Jinping,	the	former	Governor	of	Fujian	province	and	Party	
Secretary	 of	 Zhejiang	 province,	 expressed	 sympathy	 for	 the	 exporters	 during	 his	 visit	 to	




	 The	 vice-premier	 Li	 Keqiang	 and	Minister	 of	 Commerce	 Chen	 Deming	went	 on	 an	
inspection	 trip	 to	Zhejiang,	with	a	particular	 focus	on	 the	performance	of	export-oriented	
enterprises	 on	 6-8	 July.	 In	 the	 economic	 performance	 symposium	 that	 included	
representatives	 of	 both	 enterprises	 and	 government	 departments,	 Li	 listened	 to	 the	










government	 should	 help	 address	 the	 difficulties,	 especially	 those	 of	 small	 and	 medium	
enterprises.363	
	 The	vice-premier	Wang	Qishan	also	went	on	an	inspection	trip	to	Shandong	on	3-5	July	







problems	 of	 domestic	 severe	 natural	 disasters 365 	and	 the	 international	 financial	 crisis.	
Although	 emphasis	 was	 still	 placed	 on	 inflation	 control,	 the	 other	 top	 priority	 of	
macroeconomic	 management	 was	 switched	 from	 “preventing	 relatively	 fast	 economic	
growth	from	becoming	overheated”	to	“maintaining	steady	and	relatively	fast	growth	of	the	



















































depreciation,	 there	 existed	 widespread	 speculation	 that	 China	 would	 promote	 exports	
through	currency	devaluation,	to	which	China’s	top	leadership	expressed	firm	opposition.	The	
PBOC	 responded	 to	 the	market	panic	 that	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate	would	not	 continue	 to	
devalue.370	The	MOFCOM	Minster	Chen	Deming	also	remarked	that	he	would	not	expect	to	
promote	 exports	 through	 currency	 devaluation	 and	 the	 recent	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	





















of	 both	 exchange	 rate	 and	 export	 rebate	 tax	 happened	 before	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 global	
financial	 crisis	 really	hit,	 so	 that	we	 can	 somehow	 separate	 the	 “normal”	 consequence	of	
accelerated	 RMB	 appreciation	 out	 from	 the	 “extraordinary”	 consequence	 of	 the	 global	
financial	 crisis.373	A	comparison	of	China’s	export	growth	 in	 the	years	of	2007-2009	would	
shed	light	on	the	different	consequences.	As	Figure	5.12	shows,	China’s	export	continued	to	
grow	in	2008,	although	the	growth	rate	was	 lower	than	that	 in	2007.	This	 is	 the	“normal”	
consequences	 of	 accelerated	 RMB	 appreciation,	 and	 implies	 that	 the	 exporters	 perceived	
their	 difficult	 situation	 caused	 by	 the	 accelerated	 RMB	 appreciation,	 which	 has	 been	


















































































































































dramatically	by	2.2	per	 cent.	 Therefore,	China’s	 economy	 faced	 the	external	 shock	of	 the	
global	 financial	crisis	at	 the	end	of	2008,	and	the	Chinese	 leadership	rolled	out	a	series	of	
rescue	policies,	including	the	fiscal	stimulus	package	and	loose	monetary	policy	in	2009.	Amid	




RMB	 would	 remain	 stable,	 rather	 than	 depreciate	 substantially.	 There	 were	 mainly	 two	
reasons	for	this:	
“First,	substantial	devaluation	will	result	in	asset	prices	plunge.	It	will	cause	large-
scale	 foreign	 capital	 flight	 and	 more	 severe	 shock	 to	 the	 housing	 and	 stock	
markets,	which	is	at	odds	with	the	current	target	of	maintaining	stability.	Second,	
China’s	 devaluation	 may	 lead	 to	 further	 depreciations	 of	 the	 neighbouring	
countries.	 It	 is	 neither	 conducive	 to	 Asia’s	 financial	 stability	 nor	 conducive	 to	
enhancing	the	international	status	of	the	yuan.”375	
	 Under	 these	 circumstances,	China’s	 exchange	 rate	 remained	 stable	at	 around	6.83	


















After	 China	 halted	 its	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 2008,	 many	 observers	

















management	prevailed	over	 long-term	planning	 in	 the	 formation	of	economic	policy.	 This	
does	not	mean	that	the	Chinese	leadership	was	short-sighted	and	lack	of	long-term	thinking.	
Indeed,	Chinese	leaders	were	long	aware	of	the	disadvantages	of	over	dependence	on	the	
export	 and	 the	 US	 dollar.	 They	 had	 also	 made	 a	 public	 commitment	 to	 addressing	 the	
economic	imbalance.	For	example,	Wen	Jiabao	had	officially	used	very	serious	words	such	as	




excessively	 large	 extension	 of	 credit,	 excessive	 liquidity	 of	 the	 currency,	 and	














rural	 areas,	 between	 different	 regions,	 and	 between	 economic	 expansion	 and	
social	 progress.	 The	 uncoordinated	matter	 is	 that	 the	 primary,	 secondary	 and	
tertiary	 industries	 are	 not	 coordinated,	 investment	 and	 consumption	 are	 not	
coordinated,	 and	China’s	 economic	 growth	 relies	 too	much	 on	 investment	 and	
export	 [emphasis	 added].	 The	 unsustainable	 issue	 is	 that	 China	 does	 not	
effectively	address	 the	 issues	 related	 to	energy	saving,	emission	reduction	and	
environmental	 protection.	 In	 order	 to	 achieve	 sustainable	 development,	China	
needs	 to	 boost	 domestic	 consumption	 [emphasis	 added],	 push	 forward	 reform	
and	 opening-up,	 remove	 institutional	 obstacles,	 encourage	 intellectual	 and	






















simply	 that	 they	were	 not	 growing	 fast	 enough	 as	 far	 as	 the	 government	was	
concerned.”381	
	 As	to	the	2008	global	financial	crisis,	this	had	an	immediate	negative	effect	on	Chinese	








exacerbated	 the	 unbalanced	 and	 unsustainable	 elements	 in	 the	 economy,	 and	 created	
massive	infrastructural	and	industrial	over-capacity”.383	
	 To	summarize,	the	stagnation	of	China’s	exchange	rate	during	the	turbulent	times	of	




















local	 interactions	 in	China’s	exchange	 rate	policymaking	 in	2008.	The	 typical	 case	study	 in	
Fujian	province	suggests	that	exporters	faced	considerable	difficulties	and	grew	hostile	to	the	









was	 very	 much	 relegated	 to	 secondary	 importance	 behind	 domestic	 pressure	 and	
217	
	

















2008.	 They	waged	 lobbying	 campaigns	 through	 local	 governments,	 local	 offices	of	 central	
governmental	agencies	and	trade	associations.	Faced	with	considerable	pressure,	the	Chinese	
leadership	personally	investigated	several	key	manufacturing	centres	in	the	coastal	provinces.	



















consistent	 in	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 in	 2010.	 The	 third	 section	 combines	 the	 Chinese	
leadership’s	consensus	to	promote	the	internationalization	of	RMB	and	the	domestic	politics	
of	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 It	 argues	 that	 with	 the	 development	 of	 RMB	
internationalization	and	increasing	openness	of	the	capital	account,	a	flexible	exchange	rate	
was	the	feasible	choice	to	preserve	the	independence	and	effectiveness	of	Chinese	monetary	









the	 relationship	 between	 external	 pressure	 and	 China’s	 second	 round	 of	 exchange	 rate	
reform	from	June	2010,	there	have	been	divisive	debates	among	scholars	and	observers.	For	
instance,	on	one	 side	of	 the	 spectrum	 is	 the	argument	 that	 the	 increasing	US	 criticism	of	
China’s	currency	practices	gives	rise	to	China’s	exchange	rate	in	June	2010	and	the	subsequent	






dollar-RMB	 issue	 have	 already	 become	 essentially	 moribund”	 after	 the	 global	 financial	














deal	 with	 China’s	 currency	 manipulation,	 including	 deciding,	 setting	 benchmarks	 and	















crisis.	 As	 noted	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 China	 first	 halted	 its	 currency’s	 appreciation	 and	
adjusted	export	rebate	rates	for	difficult	export	sectors,	even	before	the	global	financial	crisis	
really	 hit.	 Moreover,	 China	 rolled	 out	 a	 four-trillion-yuan	 stimulus	 package	 to	 expand	






noting	 that	 the	 RMB	 issue	 was	 still	 under	 Congress’	 scrutiny	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2010.	 In	
























Congress	on	China’s	 exchange	 rate	policy	has	declined	 to	near	 vanishing	point	 over	 time.	






exchange	rate	and	 large	 interventions	 in	 the	 foreign	exchange	market.	However,	 the	April	
2009	Report	demonstrated	substantial	changes.	The	April	2009	Report	recognized	that	the	
















“First,	 China	 has	 taken	 steps	 to	 enhance	 exchange	 rate	 flexibility.	 Officials	
acknowledged	in	January	the	need	for	greater	flexibility	and	the	need	to	allow	the	













Treasury	 insisted	 that	 China	 should	 continue	 to	 allow	 for	 greater	 flexibility	 of	 the	 RMB	












economic	 growth	 and	 a	 high	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2010.	 In	 addition	 to	
pressure	from	the	Congress,	many	western	observers	and	analysts	saw	China’s	exchange	rate	
policy	as	an	important	distortion	in	the	world	economy,	which	slowed	the	recovery	of	other	
economies	worldwide,	 and	 proposed	 that	 China	must	 revalue	 its	 currency	 to	 address	 the	
imbalance.	
	 To	 name	 but	 a	 few,	 a	 report	 by	 John	Williamson,	 an	 important	 figure	 with	 wide	
credibility	 amongst	 neoliberals,	 demonstrated	 that	 China’s	 currency	 was	 substantially	
undervalued.	More	 specifically,	 his	 report	 estimated	 that	 the	 RMB	was	 about	 25	 percent	
undervalued	in	effective	terms	and	about	40	percent	undervalued	in	bilateral	terms	against	
the	US	dollar.393	Based	on	 the	Report,	 C.	 Fred	Bergsten,	Director	of	Peterson	 Institute	 for	
International	Economics,	testified	before	the	Committee	on	Ways	and	Means	on	24	March	
2010.	He	declared	 that	 the	substantial	undervaluation	of	 the	RMB	was	“a	blatant	 form	of	
protectionism”	 and	 recommended	 that	 the	 US	 Administration	 should	 label	 China	 as	 a	




























in	 June,	 which	 strived	 to	 reach	 a	 consensus	 on	 market-oriented	 exchange	 rates.	 He	
emphasised	that	“market-determined	exchange	rates	are	essential	to	global	economic	vitality”	





























after	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis,	 international	 criticism	 and	 pressure	 from	 the	 US	
administration	and	the	IMF	on	the	RMB	undervaluation	gained	momentum	in	the	first	half	of	
2010.	 Similar	 to	 the	 case	 in	 2005,	 external	 pressure	played	 an	 agenda-setting	 role,	which	



























The	 Chinese	 leadership	 did	 not	 wish	 to	 show	 any	 sign	 of	 weakness	 under	 international	
pressure.	Chinese	leaders	consistently	opposed	the	international	criticism	that	the	RMB	was	
substantially	undervalued,	and	stated	that	wrongful	accusations	and	pressure	would	not	help	














































be	 advanced	 under	 external	 pressure.409	He	 pointed	 out	 the	 general	 principle	 of	 China’s	
exchange	rate	reform:	
“China	stands	firm	in	the	direction	of	promoting	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform,	
which	 is	 based	 on	 the	 needs	 of	 China’s	 economic	 and	 social	 development.	








battle	of	 the	PBOC	vis-à-vis	 the	MOFCOM	over	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate	 reform.	The	PBOC	




















it	 does	not	 rule	out	 some	 special	policies	 in	 some	 special	periods,	 such	as	 the	
special	exchange	rate	formation	mechanism	in	the	global	financial	crisis,	which	is	
a	component	of	the	policy	package	to	cope	with	the	crisis.”412	




















revaluation	 alone	 could	 not	 resolve	 the	 Sino-US	 trade	 imbalance. 415 	Furthermore,	 Chen	
complained	that	since	2007	the	US	had	separated	China	and	imposed	additional	sets	of	export	
control	to	China,	including	computers,	civil	aviation	technology,	Computer	Numerical	Control	
(CNC)	 machines	 and	 many	 components. 416 	He	 further	 remarked	 that	 the	 US	 trade	







meetings	 in	 2010.	 Instead,	 the	 MOFCOM	 insisted	 that	 exchange	 rate	 reform	

































	 More	 specifically,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 2005,	 though	 China’s	 leaders	 made	 public	
commitments	 to	 exchange	 rate	 reform,	 they	 said	 on	 various	 occasions	 that	 no	 specific	











from	 unconventional	 policies	 and	 return	 to	 conventional	 policies,	 we	must	 be	 extremely	
prudent	about	our	choice	of	timing,”	Zhou	noted,	“this	also	includes	the	RMB	exchange	rate	
policy.” 420 	When	 asked	 subsequently	 about	 his	 views	 on	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate,	 the	
MOFCOM	Minister	Chen	confirmed	that	Zhou’s	message	represented	Chinese	government’s	




























government.	 Therefore,	 the	 Chinese	 leadership	was	more	 consistent	 in	 its	 exchange	 rate	
policy.	However,	 it	 remained	a	question	as	 to	why	 the	domestic	politics	of	exchange	 rate	









advance	 the	 reform	 on	 capital	 control	 and	 domestic	 financial	market,	 including	 the	 RMB	
exchange	 rate	 reform.	 This	 section	will	 argue	 that	 the	 Chinese	 leadership’s	 consensus	 to	
promote	 the	 internationalization	 of	 RMB	 explains	 the	 domestic	 politics	 of	 exchange	 rate	












by	 the	 PBOC	 Governor	 Zhou	 in	March	 2009.424 Referring	 to	 the	 Triffin	 Dilemma425,	 Zhou	
focused	 on	 the	 problem	 of	 relying	 on	 credit-based	 national	 currencies	 as	 the	 major	
international	reserve	currencies:	
“Issuing	 countries	 of	 reserve	 currencies	 are	 constantly	 confronted	 with	 the	
dilemma	between	achieving	their	domestic	monetary	policy	goals	and	meeting	
other	countries’	demand	for	reserve	currencies.	On	the	one	hand,	the	monetary	
authorities	 cannot	 simply	 focus	 on	 domestic	 goals	 without	 undertaking	 their	



















	 The	 solution,	 according	 to	 Zhou,	 was	 to	 establish	 a	 reserve	 currency	 that	 “is	
disconnected	 from	 individual	 nations	 and	 is	 able	 to	 remain	 stable	 in	 the	 long	 run,	 thus	
removing	the	inherent	deficiencies	caused	by	using	credit-based	national	currencies”.427	He	
further	 suggested	 that	 the	 Special	 Drawing	 Right	 (SDR),	 as	 “a	 super-sovereign	 reserve	
currency”,	 could	 be	 “the	 light	 in	 the	 tunnel	 for	 the	 reform	of	 the	 international	monetary	
system”.428	Zhou	 proposed	 a	 shift	 away	 from	 the	 dollar	 and	 instead	 the	 use	 of	 the	 SDR.	
Specifically,	 Zhou	 argued	 that	 “special	 consideration	 should	 be	 given	 to	 giving	 the	 SDR	 a	
greater	role,	as	the	SDR	has	the	features	and	potential	to	act	as	a	super-sovereign	reserve	
currency.”429	
	 In	 retrospect,	 Zhou	 was	 right	 to	 point	 out	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 dollar-dominant	
international	monetary	 system,	while	 he	 underestimated	 the	 institutional	 limitations	 and	
political	obstacles	that	prevented	the	SDR	from	challenging	the	dollar.430	Zhou’s	call	for	SDRs	
as	 the	 super-sovereign	 reserve	 currency	 eventually	 lost	 momentum,	 and	 the	 Chinese	
leadership	turned	to	promote	the	diversification	of	international	monetary	system,	thereby	
reducing	the	reliance	on	the	dollar.	














Summit.431	At	 the	 opening	 ceremony	 of	 Bo’ao	 Forum	 in	 April	 2009,	 Premier	Wen	 Jiabao	
continued	to	advocate	implementing	the	consensus	reached	at	the	G20	London	Summit	and	
advancing	the	reforms	of	international	financial	system.	More	specifically,	Wen	proposed	“to	





confirmed	 the	 central	 importance	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 in	 stimulating	 the	 RMB	
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cross-border	 trade	 beginning	 from	 2009.	 Beijing	 gradually	 widened	 the	 range	 of	 trade	
transactions,	 in	which	there	were	three	stages	of	development.	First,	on	8	April	2009,	 the	
State	 Council	 executive	meeting	 decided	 to	 implement	 the	 pilot	 RMB	 cross-border	 trade	
settlement	 at	 Shanghai	 and	 four	 cities	 (Guangzhou,	 Shenzhen,	 Zhuhai	 and	 Dongguan)	 in	








border	 trade	settlement	within	 the	pilot	areas	be	expanded	to	20	provinces,	and	that	 the	
overseas	 coverage	 be	 expanded	 from	Hong	 Kong,	Macao	 and	ASEAN	 to	 all	 countries	 and	
regions.436	By	the	end	of	2010,	the	number	of	Chinese	pilot	enterprises	had	risen	from	the	
initial	365	firms	to	more	than	67,000.437	Third,	on	23	August	2011,	PBOC,	MOF,	MOFCOM,	
General	 Administration	 of	 Customs,	 State	 Administration	 of	 Taxation,	 China	 Banking	
Regulatory	Commission	jointly	announced	the	“Notice	on	Expanding	the	RMB	Cross-border	
Trade	Settlement	Areas”,	which	approved	 that	 the	RMB	cross-border	 trade	settlement	be	
expanded	to	the	whole	country.438	























	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	
Trade	settlement	amount	 36	 5064	 20800	 29409	 46300	
- Trade	in	goods	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 20642	 30200	





	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	
Total	amount	of	payments	
and	receipts	
36	 5064	 20800	 28700	 46300	
- Payments	 N/A	 799	 7704	 13000	 18800	
- Receipts	 N/A	 4285	 13096	 15700	 27500	
Ratio	of	receipts	to	
payments		
N/A	 1:1.5	 1:1.70	 1:1.20	 1:1.46	
Gap	between	receipts	and	
payments	












second	 half	 of	 2010	 alone	 (38	 billion	 yuan)	 equalled	 that	 of	 the	 previous	 three	 years	
combined.439	The	 bond	 insurance	markets	 have	 also	 expanded	 from	 Hong	 Kong	 to	 other	
financial	centres	including	London,	Singapore,	Sydney	and	Luxembourg.	For	instance,	HSBC	




























	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	
Direct	investment	amount	 N/A	 N/A	 1109	 2840	 5337	
- Foreign	Direct	
Investment	(FDI)	
N/A	 N/A	 907	 2536	 4481	
- Outward	Direct	
Investment	(ODI)	
N/A	 N/A	 202	 304	 856	
RMB	Qualified	Foreign	
Institutional	Investor	(RQFII)	





















enterprise	 can	 get	 access	 to	 timely	 financing,	 thereby	 promoting	 the	 bilateral	
trade	and	investment.”443	
	 However,	 the	 interviewee	 also	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	mechanism	would	 only	 work	
under	 the	 condition	 that	 the	 RMB	 was	 used	 in	 the	 bilateral	 trade	 and	 investment	 (as	















6.3.3	 Explaining	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 under	 the	 context	 of	 RMB	
internationalization	
As	mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 there	was	 very	 limited	 controversy	within	 Chinese	
central	 government	 in	 terms	of	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate	 reform	and	Chinese	 leaders	were	
consistent	 in	 the	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 in	 the	 case	 of	 2010.	 Based	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	
development	of	RMB	internationalization,	this	part	will	argue	that	the	Chinese	leadership’s	





internationalizing	 the	 RMB.	However,	 economic	 size	 alone	 is	 not	 enough	 to	make	 RMB	 a	
competitive	 international	currency.	Setting	aside	the	problem	of	political	determinants	 for	
the	 moment,	 economists	 have	 identified	 three	 key	 factors	 –	 confidence,	 liquidity	 and	



















































exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 in	 2010.	On	 the	other	 hand,	 the	Chinese	 central	 government	










	 Furthermore,	 like	 the	 first	 round	of	 the	exchange	 rate	 reform,	 the	key	principle	of	









of	 the	 second	 round	of	 exchange	 rate	 reform.	 The	 stability	 and	predictability	 of	 the	RMB	
exchange	 rate	was	one	of	 the	most	 important	attributes	 in	 improving	 the	confidence	and	
promoting	the	international	use	of	RMB.	Furthermore,	the	exchange	rate	reform	proceeded	
in	the	market-oriented	direction.	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	PBOC	announced	on	14	April	2012	








































It	 is	worthwhile	 to	note	 that	 two	other	 seemingly	plausible	 factors	 could	also	explain	 the	
Chinese	leadership’s	decision	to	carry	out	the	2010	exchange	rate	reform.	The	first	argument	
is	to	facilitate	the	economic	transition	and	rebalancing.	There	is	no	denying	that	Hu	and	Wen	
had	 the	 long-standing	 desire	 to	 rebalance	 China’s	 economy	 away	 from	heavy	 reliance	 on	
exports	towards	consumption.	It	is	also	analytically	true	that	a	more	flexible	and	appreciated	
RMB	exchange	rate	would	be	conducive	to	China’s	economic	restructuring,	as	the	exchange	
rate	 was	 an	 important	 price	 mechanism	 to	 help	 transform	 the	 Chinese	 export-oriented	
economy	to	a	domestic	consumption-driven	economy.	However,	as	mentioned	in	Chapter	5,	
the	 Chinese	 leadership	 placed	 priority	 on	 growth	 and	 stability	 and	 often	 place	 economic	
reforms	in	secondary	place.	Therefore,	the	limited	nature	of	exchange	rate	policy	reform	also	
had	a	limited	impact	on	the	economic	transition.	

































































reduction	 through	 exchange	 rate	 appreciation	 from	 2010	 to	 2013.	 With	 the	 benefit	 of	
hindsight,	 there	 is	 also	 little	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 second	 round	of	 exchange	 rate	






policy	 and	 curb	 domestic	 inflation.	 Chinese	 policy	 makers,	 especially	 the	 PBOC	 officials,	
recognized	the	benefits	of	exchange	rate	flexibility.	However,	careful	analysis	of	China’s	CPI	
data	(see	Figure	6.4)	shows	that	there	is	little	support	for	this	argument	as	well.	China’s	annual	














This	 chapter	has	examined	 the	 resumption	of	RMB	exchange	 rate	 reform,	beginning	 from	
June	2010.	As	with	Chapter	3,	the	level	I	game	and	level	II	game	should	be	combined	to	explain	
the	Chinese	leadership’s	decision	to	continue	the	exchange	rate	reform	in	2010.	On	the	one	
hand,	 analysis	 of	 US	 Congress	 RMB-related	 bills	 and	 Treasury’s	 Reports	 to	 Congress	 on	
International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	as	well	as	 IMF’s	Consultation	Reports	on	China	
demonstrates	that	external	criticism	and	pressure	still	played	an	important	role	of	agenda-































cross-border	 trade	 beginning	 from	2009.	 Beijing	 not	 only	 gradually	widened	 the	 range	 of	
trade	 transactions	 but	 also	 facilitated	 the	 development	 of	 RMB	 international	 investment.	
Moreover,	China’s	central	bank	signed	bilateral	currency-swap	agreements	with	a	number	of	
central	banks	and	monetary	authorities	to	expand	the	use	of	the	RMB	in	international	trade	




and	 predictability	 of	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 attributes	 in	
improving	 the	confidence	and	promoting	 the	 international	use	of	RMB,	 it	determined	 the	









exchange	 rate	 policymaking,	 notably	 during	 the	 Hu-Wen	 administration.	 It	 has	 sought	 to	
address	 the	 research	 questions	 raised	 in	 the	 introduction	 by	 examining	 the	 international	
political	economy	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	from	a	theoretical	and	an	empirical	
perspective.	 This	 chapter	 firstly	 summarises	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 and	 the	 empirical	
findings	of	the	thesis.	It	then	relates	China’s	exchange	rate	reforms	to	the	wider	context	of	
China’s	politics.	The	empirical	studies	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	from	2003	to	2013	have	
















makers	 are	understood	 to	 strive	 to	 reconcile	 international	pressures,	domestic	ministerial	
interests	 and	 domestic	 interest	 groups	 when	 making	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 policies.	 More	
specifically,	the	three-level	game	framework	examines	the	Chinese	leadership’s	negotiations	
with	 the	 international	 bargainers	 at	 the	 international	 level	 (level	 I),	 negotiations	between	
central	government’s	ministries	at	the	central	governmental	level	(level	II)	and	negotiations	
with	the	domestic	interest	groups	and	local	governments	at	the	local	level	(level	III).	
	 However,	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 adapted	 three-level	 game	 framework	 and	 the	







	 The	 first	 answer	 to	 these	 questions	 is	 that	 the	 thesis	 shows	how	 the	 level	 I	 game	










specific	 pathway	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 reform,	 one	 needs	 to	 further	 explore	 China’s	
domestic	politics.	




more	 monetary	 policy	 autonomy.	 Nevertheless,	 PBOC’s	 position	 was	 challenged	 by	 the	
MOFCOM,	which	preferred	a	 fixed	 (and	undervalued)	RMB	exchange	 rate.	 The	MOFCOM,	
with	 their	 constituencies	 within	 China’s	 state-owned	 enterprises	 and	 a	 more	 politically	
powerful	Minister	 (Bo	Xilai),	was	more	 influential	over	 the	central	 government’s	decision-
making	than	the	PBOC.	As	a	result	of	compromise,	PBOC’s	wish	for	exchange	rate	flexibility	
was	granted,	but	was	considerably	qualified	to	satisfy	MOFCOM’s	concerns.	The	initial	RMB	
appreciation	 was	 limited	 to	 2.1	 percent	 against	 the	 dollar,	 and	 the	 pace	 of	 subsequent	
appreciation	 was	 to	 be	 relatively	 stable	 and	 slow.	 After	 July	 2005,	 the	 PBOC	 faced	 an	
increasing	 policy	 dilemma	 in	 simultaneously	 maintaining	 the	 gradually	 appreciated	 RMB	
exchange	 rates	 and	 controlling	 the	 domestic	money	 supply,	where	 there	were	 persistent	
current	account	surplus	and	capital	inflows.	
	 Third,	the	 level	 III	game	provided	the	most	 important	sources	for	the	stagnation	of	
China’s	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 in	 2008,	 and	 China	 returned	 to	 the	 de-facto	 dollar-pegged	
exchange	rate	regime	during	the	global	financial	crisis.	China	faced	rising	inflationary	pressure	
in	2007	and	the	Chinese	leadership	made	inflation	prevention	the	top	priority	in	the	fourth	












	 Fourth,	 the	 level	 I	 game	 once	 again	 played	 an	 agenda-setting	 role	 in	 the	 2010	
exchange	rate	reform,	but	the	level	II	game	was	important	as	well,	resulting	in	the	Chinese	
leadership	allowing	the	RMB	to	appreciate	against	the	dollar	in	a	gradual	and	steady	manner.	
While	the	Congress’s	 influence	on	the	RMB	 issue	generally	diminished	over	time	after	 the	
global	financial	crisis,	international	criticism	and	pressure	from	the	US	administration	and	the	




government	 in	2010.	Therefore,	 the	Chinese	 leadership	was	more	consistent	on	exchange	
rate	 policy.	 The	 underlying	 reason	 was	 that,	 with	 the	 development	 of	 RMB	
internationalization	 and	 increasing	 openness	 of	 the	 capital	 account	 after	 2009,	 a	 flexible	
exchange	 rate	 was	 Chinese	 government’s	 feasible	 choice	 to	 maintain	 independent	 and	
effective	monetary	policy.	As	the	stability	and	predictability	of	RMB	exchange	rate	was	one	
of	the	most	 important	attributes	 in	 improving	confidence	and	promoting	the	 international	
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use	of	RMB,	 it	determined	 the	pathway	of	gradual	and	steady	appreciation	 in	 the	 second	
round	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform.	
	 Last,	the	empirical	study	responds	to	the	question	as	to	why	China’s	exchange	rate	
policymaking	 is	 a	 three-level	 game	 rather	 than	 a	 two-level	 one.	 Of	 course,	 this	 could	 be	
treated	 simply	 as	 a	 modified	 two	 level	 game.	 However,	 the	 suggestion	 here	 is	 that	 the	
difference	between	the	two	domestic	games	is	so	great	that	it	is	better	conceived	of	as	two	
separate	 negotiations,	 rather	 than	 two	 parts	 of	 the	 same	 domestic	 game.	 Although	 the	
MOFCOM	strongly	advocated	for	the	interests	of	export	sectors	in	2005	and	2006,	there	were	
few	 signs	 of	 direct	 lobbying	 from	 export	 enterprises	 after	 the	 initiation	 of	 exchange	 rate	
reform.	 In	 contrast,	 when	 it	 came	 to	 2008,	 export	 enterprises	 lobbied	 through	 local	





	 To	 sum	 up,	 this	 thesis	 examines	 the	 international	 political	 economy	 of	 China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking	from	a	theoretical	and	an	empirical	perspective.	The	three-level	
game	 framework	and	 the	empirical	 studies	provide	a	 richer	portrait	of	 the	dynamism	and	
complexity	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	in	the	Hu-Wen	era.	The	thesis	has	clearly	














linear	 process,	 in	 which	 both	 international	 and	 domestic	 political	 powers	 influenced	 the	
timing	and	drove	the	pace	of	exchange	rate	reforms.	Although	the	overall	direction	of	China’s	
exchange	 rate	 reform	 was	 towards	 greater	 liberalisation,	 there	 was	 limited	 evidence	 to	






rate	 policies	 in	 both	 2005	 and	 2010.	 In	 particular,	 exchange	 rate	 reform	was	 unlikely	 to	
happen	 in	 2005	 without	 the	 mounting	 external	 pressure,	 considering	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
MOFCOM	was	far	more	politically	powerful	than	the	PBOC	in	China’s	central	government	and	
the	potential	negative	effects	of	RMB	appreciation.	Both	the	PBOC	and	the	MOFCOM	kept	a	















system	 and	 the	 needs	 of	 political	 leaders	 in	 the	 system.	 Despite	 different	 exchange	 rate	
reform	policies	in	the	different	periods	of	time,	the	researcher	holds	the	view	that	it	is	still	
possible	 to	 reach	 some	 conclusions	 as	 to	 the	 relationship	between	China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	and	the	nature	of	China’s	politics.	














even	 more	 so	 as	 long	 as	 the	 economy	 continues	 to	 grow	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 being	 market	
oriented.” 454 	And	 as	 Miller	 argues,	 “the	 problems	 of	 governing	 an	 increasingly	 globally	
interdependent	 and	 market-driven	 economy	 and	 a	 correspondingly	 more	 complex	 and	
sophisticated	 society	 required	 a	 politics	 of	 expertise,”455 	in	 particular	 the	 (international)	
economic	expertise	from	the	empowered	ministries	and	agencies.	
	 Therefore,	 China’s	 changing	 political-socioeconomic	 landscapes	 determined	 the	
growing	 importance	 of	 ministerial	 politics	 in	 China’s	 economic	 policymaking,	 and	 more	
specifically,	the	bargaining	game	between	the	MOFCOM	and	the	PBOC	in	China’s	exchange	






	 It	 also	 suggests	 that	Hu	 and	Wen	exercised	 effective	 governance	by	maintaining	 a	














decision,	 government	 agencies	 would	 adhere	 to	 the	 principle	 and	 implement	 the	 policy,	

























analysts	 recognized	 Hu-Wen’s	 shifted	 priority	 to	 sustainable	 development	 and	 social	
development	after	the	leadership	transition	in	2002.	For	instance,	Liew	and	Wu	argue	that:	
“There	 is	 without	 doubt	 a	 fundamental	 shift	 in	 emphasis	 between	 the	 Jiang	





modern	and	prosperous	 cities	of	 Shanghai	or	 Shenzhen	but	 rather	 to	Xibaipo	 [西柏坡],	 a	
village	 in	 Hebei,	 and	 Inner	 Mongolia.	 Particularly,	 Hu	 Jintao	 put	 forward	 the	 “scientific	
development	outlook”	 [科学发展观]	 in	 the	Third	Plenary	Session	of	 the	16th	CCP	Central	




	 However,	with	 the	wisdom	of	hindsight,	Hu’s	 proposal	 of	 a	 scientific	 development	
outlook	 was	 not	 translated	 into	 concrete	measures.	 China’s	 first	 round	 of	 exchange	 rate	
reform	 from	2005	 to	2008	could	be	one	of	 the	best	 footnotes	 to	 this	argument.	Effective	



































The	 thesis	 has	made	 a	 first	 attempt	 to	 construct	 a	 three-level	 game	 framework	 to	 study	
China’s	exchange	rate	politics.	The	explanatory	strengths	of	the	theoretical	framework	have	
already	been	demonstrated	in	the	empirical	studies.	However,	it	does	not	constitute	the	final	



























constantly	 improved	 and	 upgraded;	 and	 third,	 the	 economy	 is	 increasingly	 driven	 by	




preserve	 the	 independence	and	effectiveness	of	Chinese	monetary	policy.	A	more	 flexible	
RMB	exchange	rate	was	in	turn	conducive	to	the	international	use	of	RMB.	More	specifically,	
China’s	exchange	rate	experienced	a	depreciation	tendency	in	the	first	half	of	2014,	which	
was	 unprecedented	 in	 the	 previous	 years.	 After	 this,	 two-way	 fluctuations	 of	 the	 RMB	
exchange	rate	was	becoming	the	“new	normal”,	which	indicated	that	the	Chinese	currency	
become	increasingly	market-oriented.	In	particular,	the	PBOC	announced	a	further	reform	of	
the	exchange	 rate	 system	on	11	August	2015.	The	daily	 central	parity	quotes	of	 the	RMB	
exchange	 rate	 against	 the	 dollar	 were	 to	 take	 into	 consideration	 the	 closing	 rate	 of	 the	
previous	day,	the	demand	and	supply	of	the	foreign	exchange	market,	and	the	exchange	rates	
of	 the	 world’s	 major	 currencies.466 	Moreover,	 RMB	 was	 included	 in	 IMF’s	 SDR	 basket	 in	











































rate	 regime?	 In	 short,	 the	 thesis	 invites	 future	 comparative	 case	 studies	of	exchange	 rate	
policymaking	 to	explore	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 international	and	domestic	 factors	 interact,	
what	factors	exert	the	most	influences	and	the	conditions	under	which	they	matter	most	in	
different	countries.	
	 In	conclusion,	 this	 thesis	makes	a	contribution	by	providing	original	and	systematic	
research	 on	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 in	 the	 Hu-Wen	 era.	 The	 thesis	 makes	 a	
modest	theoretical	contribution	to	the	existing	body	of	CPE	and	IPE	literature	by	developing	































































































































































































































































































































































Total	 3010	 400	 0	 15072	
Q1	 0	 400	 0	 4352	
Q2	 700	 0	 0	 2390	
Q3	 1710	 0	 0	 2989.5	






Total	 7230	 380	 0	 27882	
Q1	 550	 380	 0	 7130	
Q2	 900	 0	 0	 6450	
Q3	 3400	 0	 0	 5350	






Total	 19900	 1183	 0	 36510	
Q1	 7040	 1183	 0	 13200	
Q2	 4150	 0	 0	 9040	
Q3	 6350	 0	 0	 8162	






Total	 11185	 900	 6100	 40680	
Q1	 3400	 900	 0	 18030	
Q2	 0	 0	 0	 7950	
Q3	 750	 0	 6000	 9910	






Total	 33260	 0	 0	 42990	
Q1	 18350	 0	 0	 17860	
Q2	 5120	 0	 0	 11530	
Q3	 6010	 0	 0	 9810	

















Total	 41710	 0	 0	 40260	
Q1	 11150	 0	 0	 4800	
Q2	 11700	 0	 0	 9300	
Q3	 8700	 0	 0	 12910	






Total	 20850	 0	 0	 42360	
Q1	 8930	 0	 0	 14350	
Q2	 5920	 0	 0	 11680	
Q3	 3430	 0	 0	 12330	






Total	 24790	 0	 0	 14020	
Q1	 8150	 0	 0	 3370	
Q2	 5450	 0	 0	 5860	
Q3	 6290	 0	 0	 1640	






Total	 9440	 60380	 0	 0	
Q1	 3980	 3520	 0	 0	
Q2	 5460	 2140	 0	 0	
Q3	 0	 22930	 0	 0	






Total	 7650	 21660	 0	 5362	
Q1	 2530	 13440	 0	 0	
Q2	 5120	 170	 0	 1140	
Q3	 0	 4700	 0	 4008	








Date	 RRR	before	adjustment	 Adjustment	range	 RRR	after	adjustment		
2012.5.18	 20.5%	 -0.5%	 20.0%	
2012.2.24	 21.0%	 -0.5%	 20.5%	
2011.12.5	 21.5%	 -0.5%	 21.0%	
2011.6.20	 21.0%	 0.5%	 21.5%	
2011.5.18	 20.5%	 0.5%	 21.0%	
2011.4.21	 20.0%	 0.5%	 20.5%	
2011.3.25	 19.5%	 0.5%	 20.0%	
2011.2.24	 19.0%	 0.5%	 19.5%	
2011.1.20	 18.5%	 0.5%	 19.0%	
2010.12.20	 18.0%	 0.5%	 18.5%	
2010.11.29	 17.5%	 0.5%	 18.0%	
2010.11.16	 17.0%	 0.5%	 17.5%	
2010.5.10	 16.5%	 0.5%	 17.0%	
2010.2.25	 16.0%	 0.5%	 16.5%	
2010.1.18	 15.5%	 0.5%	 16.0%	
2008.12.25	 16.0%	 -0.5%	 15.5%	
2008.12.05	 17.0%	 -1.0%	 16.0%	
2008.10.15	 17.5%	 -0.5%	 17.0%	
2008.06.07	 16.5%	 1.0%	 17.5%	
2008.05.20	 16.0%	 0.5%	 16.5%	
2008.04.25	 15.5%	 0.5%	 16.0%	
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Date	 RRR	before	adjustment	 Adjustment	range	 RRR	after	adjustment		
2008.03.18	 15.0%	 0.5%	 15.5%	
2008.01.25	 14.5%	 0.5%	 15.0%	
2007.12.25	 13.5%	 1.0%	 14.5%	
2007.11.26	 13.0%	 0.5%	 13.5%	
2007.10.25	 12.5%	 0.5%	 13.0%	
2007.09.25	 12.0%	 0.5%	 12.5%	
2007.08.15	 11.5%	 0.5%	 12.0%	
2007.06.05	 11.0%	 0.5%	 11.5%	
2007.05.15	 10.5%	 0.5%	 11.0%	
2007.04.16	 10.0%	 0.5%	 10.5%	
2007.02.25	 9.5%	 0.5%	 10.0%	
2007.01.15	 9.0%	 0.5%	 9.5%	
2006.11.15	 8.5%	 0.5%	 9.0%	
2006.08.15	 8.0%	 0.5%	 8.5%	
2006.07.5	 7.5%	 0.5%	 8.0%	
2004.04.25	 7.0%	 0.5%	 7.5%	











































2.	 After	 two	 years	 of	 gradual	 appreciation,	 the	 speed	 of	 RMB	 appreciation	 accelerated,	
especially	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2008.	What	 were	 impacts	 of	 the	 rapid	 appreciation	 on	 the	
exporters	in	Fujian	province?		
Two	follow	up	questions	require	in-depth	exploration.	
























3.	 After	 two	 years	 of	 gradual	 appreciation,	 the	 speed	 of	 RMB	 appreciation	 accelerated,	





















trade	 settlement	 at	 Shanghai	 and	 four	 cities	 (Guangzhou,	 Shenzhen,	 Zhuhai	 and	
Dongguan)	in	Guangdong.	
29	June	2009	
PBOC	 and	Hong	 Kong	Monetary	 Authority	 signed	 a	memorandum	 to	 promote	 RMB	
cross-border	trade.	
2	July	2009	





















Three	 Types	 of	 Institution	 Including	 Overseas	 RMB	 Clearing	 Banks	 Making	 RMB	
Investment	 into	 the	 Inter-bank	 Bond	 Market”.	 It	 allows	 foreign	 central	 banks	 or	
monetary	authorities,	RMB	settlement	banks	in	Hong	Kong	or	Macau,	and	RMB	cross-




Pilot	 RMB	 cross-border	 trade	 and	 investment	 settlement	 was	 officially	 launched	 in	












PBOC,	MOF,	MOFCOM,	 General	 Administration	 of	 Customs,	 State	 Administration	 of	
Taxation,	and	China	Banking	Regulatory	Commission	jointly	announced	the	“Notice	on	






















currency	 futures	 product,	 to	 provide	 greater	 capital	 efficiency	 and	 flexibility	 for	 the	
offshore	RMB	market.	
10	April	2013	




























































9	 New	Zealand	 18	April	2011	 250	 3	
10	 Uzbekistan	 19	April	2011	 7	 3	
11	 Mongolia	 6	May	2011	 50	 3	
12	 Kazakhstan	 13	June	2011	 70	 3	
13	 Thailand	 22	December	2011	 700	 3	
14	 Pakistan	 23	December	2011	 100	 3	
15	 United	Arab	Emirates	 17	January	2012	 350	 3	
16	 Turkey	 21	February	2012	 100	 3	
17	 Australia	 22	March	2012	 2000	 3	
18	 Ukraine	 26	June	2012	 150	 3	
19	 Brazil	 26	March	2013	 1900	 3	
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20	 UK	 22	June	2013	 2000	 3	
21	 Hungary	 9	September	2013	 100	 3	
22	 Albania	 12	September	2013	 20	 3	
23	 European	Central	Bank	 8	October	2013	 3500	 3	
Total	sum	 25502*	 	
*	For	renewed	agreement,	the	renewed	amount	has	been	calculated	and	the	expired	amount	has	
been	discarded.	
	
Source:	Author-collected	data	from	the	official	website	of	People’s	Bank	of	China	
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